University of Cincinnati

University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and
Publications
Faculty Articles and Other Publications

College of Law Faculty Scholarship

2002

Protecting Intrastate Threatened Species: Does the
Endangered Species Act Encroach on Traditional
State Authority and Exceed the Outer Limits of the
Commerce Clause
Bradford Mank
University of Cincinnati College of Law, brad.mank@uc.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.uc.edu/fac_pubs
Part of the Environmental Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Mank, Bradford, "Protecting Intrastate Threatened Species: Does the Endangered Species Act Encroach on Traditional State Authority
and Exceed the Outer Limits of the Commerce Clause" (2002). Faculty Articles and Other Publications. Paper 264.
http://scholarship.law.uc.edu/fac_pubs/264

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law Faculty Scholarship at University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship
and Publications. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Articles and Other Publications by an authorized administrator of University of
Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications. For more information, please contact ken.hirsh@uc.edu.

PROTECTING INTRASTATE THREATENED
SPECIES: DOES THE ENDANGERED
.....
SPECIES ACT ENCROACH ON
TRADITIONAL STATE AUTHORITY AND
EXCEED THE OUTER LIMITS OF THE
COMMERCE CLAUSE?
Bradford C. Mank*
1. INTRODUCTION

Mer broadly construing the scope of congressional authority
under the Commerce Clause for nearly sixty years, in 1995, the
Supreme Court stunned many legal commentators by striking down
a federal statute regulating intrastate gun possession near local
schools in United States v. Lopez, l a five-to-four decision. The Court
reasoned that such noneconomic activity was traditionally a state
regulatory function and therefore outside the scope of the Clause. 2
Five years later in United States v. Morrison, 3 another five-to-four
decision, the Court held that a federal statute penalizing intrastate
gender-based violence intruded on traditional state authority over
criminal matters and thus exceeded the scope of the Commerce
Clause-despite congressional findings about the effects of genderbased violence on the national economy.4 Because federal environ-

• James B. Helmer, Jr., Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati. B.A., 1983, Harvard
University; J.D., 1987, Yale Law School. I thank John Copeland Nagle for his perceptive
comments and Theresa Zawacki for her research assistance. All errors or omissions are my
responsibility.
1 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
2 Id. at 567·68. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion, joined by Justices
O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas. Id. at 550. The same five justices were in the
majority in United States 11. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), and Solid Waste Agency of
Northern Cook County 11. United States Army CorpsofEng'rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001) (SWANCC),
discussed below. See infra notes 117·30, 145·75 and accompanying text (discussing positions
taken by Justices). Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer dissented in Lopez,
Morrison and SWANCC. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 550; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 655; Solid Waste
Agency, 531 U.S. at 176.
3 529 U.S. 598.
4 Id. at 614. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion, joined by Justices
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mental statutes rely on the Commerce Clause as the basis for
congressional authority, a broad reading of Lopez and Morrison
might call into question the constitutionality of at least some
environmental statutes or regulations.
In particular, the Endangered Species Act of 1973 ("ESA")5 is
likely to raise concerns under the Court's recent interpretation of
the Commerce Clause because the statute regulates numerous
species that have little commercial value and affects individual
landowners. 6 While the Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence is
ultimately more concerned with the impacts of activities upon
interstate commerce than the activities' location, 7 most judges and
commentators have assumed that whether a species is located in
only one state or crosses state boundaries is an important factor. 8
A large number of endangered or threatened
species-approximately half-have habitats limited to one state. 9
O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas. Id. atGOO. Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer again dissented. Id.
5 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44 (1994).
6 See Stephen M. Johnson, United States v. Lopez: A Misstep, But Hardly Epochal for
Federal Environmental Regulation, 5 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 33, 66-G7 (1996) [hereinafter
Johnson, United States v. Lopez: A Misstep] (explaining certain provisions ofESA "regulate
both commercial and noncommercial activities ... [and) often regulate local land use"); Omar
N. White, The Endangered Species Act's Precarious Perch: A Constitutional Analysis Under
the Commerce Clause and the Treaty Power, 27 ECOLOGYL.Q. 215, 217-18 (2000) (comparing
species with commercial value as tourist objects to species that "appear to be of interest only
to researchers"; both are protected); Jeanine A. Scalero, Case Note, The Endangered Species
Act:S Application to Isolated Species: A Substantial Effect on Interstate Commerce?, 3 CHAP.
L. REv. 317, 318-21 (2000) (discussing ESA). Whether the Endangered Species Act can be
justified under the Treaty Power is beyond the scope of this Article. See White, supra, at 22434 (arguing Treaty Power provides less stable support for Endangered Species Act than
Commerce Clause because treaties may be amended by either United States or another
nation).
7 See infra notes 72-87 and accompanying text (discussing Commerce Clause).
8 One commentator has questioned whether intrastate endangered species necessarily
raise greater Commerce Clause issues than some species that live in more than one state, but
lack significant commercial value. See John Copeland Nagle, The Commerce Clause Meets
the Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly, 97 MICH. L. REv. 174. 185 n.49 (1998) (,'Why the fact that
a bird or animal crosses state lines of its own violation and without being itself an object of
interstate commerce is sufficient for Commerce Clause purposes remains unexplained."); see
infra notes 333-56 and accompanying text (discussing Commerce Clause and ESA).
Nevertheless, most judges and commentators have assumed that exclusively intrastate
species raise the most serious questions under the Commerce Clause. See infra notes 188-91
and accompanying text (discussing significance of interstate characteristic).
9 See Nat'l ABs'n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1052 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(observing 521 of 1082 species in United States listed as endangered or threatened in 1997

2002]

ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT

725

Many of these intrastate endangered species do not currently
possess significant economic value in ·interstate commerce. 10'
Moreover, many threatened and endangered species that do cross
state lines lack significant commercial value, and as a result, even
their regulation under the ESA may present significant Commerce
Clause issues. l l Furthermore, most endangered or threatened
species are located on primarily non-federal land and thus not
subject to protection under the Property Clause, discussed below. 12
In 2001, the Supreme Court indirectly addressed the impact of
Lopez and Morrison on federal environmental law. In Solid Waste
Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Army Corps of
Engineers ("SWANCC"),13 yet another five-to-four decision, the
Court held that an Army Corps of Engineers' ("the Corps") regulation defining the Corps' jurisdiction to include "isolated" intrastate
wetlands and waters that serve as habitat for migratory birds
exceeded its statutory authority under the Clean Water Act. 14 The
Court concluded that the Act's reliance on the term "navigable
waters" in defining the scope of the statute's wetlands jurisdiction
demonstrated that Congress did not intend to include "isolated"
intrastate wetlands or waters that had no connection to navigable
were found in only one state).
10 See Nagle, supra note 8, at 182 (discussing several intrastate endangered species with
no known commercial or recreational value); Eric Brignac, Recent Development, The
Commerce Clause Justi{icatian ofFederal Endangered Species Protectian: Gibbs v. Babbitt,
79 N.C. L. REv. 873, 883 (2001) (arguing many endangered species have little commercial
value).
11 See infra notes 333-56 and accompanying text (discussing concerns of ESA and
Commerce Clause).
12 Scalero, supra note 6, at 321 ("[A]lmost 80% of protected species have some or all of
their habitat on privately owned land."). According to the General Accounting Office, in 1993,
781 species were listed under the ESA-over 90% of these species have some or all of their
habitat on nonfederallands. Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 502 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied
sub nom., Gibbs v. Norton, 531 U.S. 1145 (2001). Nearly three-fourths of the listed species
had over 60% of their habitat on nonfederallands. Id.
.
13 Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps ofEng'rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
14 Id. at 174; William Funk, The Court, the Clean Water Act, and the Constitutian:
SWANCCandBeyond, 31EnvtL L.Rep. (Envtl L. Inst.) 10741 (News & Analysis) (July 2001)
(discussing SWANCC); Stephen M. Johnson, Federal Regulation of Isolated Wetlands After
SWANCC, 31 Envtl. L. Rep. (EnvtL L. Inst.) 10669 (News & Analysis) (June 2001) (discussing
SWANCC); MayaR. Moiseyev, Solid Waste Agency ofNorthem Cook Countyv. United States
Army Corps of Engineers: The Clean Water Act Bypasses a Commerce Clause Challenge, But
Can the Endangered Species Act?, 7 HAsTINGsW.-Nw.J.ENVTL. L. &POL'y 191, 19~95 (2001)
(discussing court's analysis in SWANCC).
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waters within the Act's jurisdiction. 15 The Court deliberately read
the statute's jurisdiction over "navigable waters" narrowly to avoid
the constitutional question of whether federal regulation of isolated
waters and wetlands would violate the Commerce Clause. IS Because
its decision was based solely on statutory grounds, the Court did not
decide whether federal regulation of isolated intrastate wetlands
exceeded congressional authority under the Commerce Clause,
although, in dicta, the decision suggested that the Corps' interpretation may have exceeded that authority.17 Nevertheless, while not
directly addressing the scope of the Commerce Clause, the SWANCC
Court's narrow interpretation of the Clean Water Act to exclude
regulation of intrastate isolated wetlands reflected its concern that
the Corps' broader interpretation would "alter[] the federal-state
framework by permitting federal encroachment upon a traditional
state power."18
Now that it has decided the issue of isolated wetlands in
SWANCC, the Court is likely to next address whether the Endangered Species Act may provide federal protection to intrastate
endangered species that lack significant commercial value. Unlike
the situation in SWANCC, the Supreme Court cannot simply avoid
the issue of whether the Endangered Species Act's regulation of
intrastate species on non-federal land is constitutional under the
Commerce Clause by applying a narrow construction of the statute.
15 See Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 163·64 (interpreting Federal Water Pollution
Control Act § 404(a), Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (1994». See generally Funk, supra
note 14, at 10746·59 (criticizing SWANCC for construing term "navigable waters" too
narrowly in light of Riverside Bayview Homes precedent and legislative history of Clean
Water Act); Michael P. Healy, Textualism's Limits on the Administrative State: Of Isolated
Waters, Barking Dogs, and Chevron, 31 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10928, 10929·35 (News
& Analysis) (Aug. 2001) (criticizing SWANCC for using restrictive textualist interpretation
that was inconsistent with Court's prior interpretation of term "navigable waters" in
Riverside Bayview Homes); Johnson, supra note 14, at 10672 (observing SWANCCinterpreted
term "navigable waters" inconsistently with Riverside Bayview Homes precedent).
16 See Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 172· 73 (discussing how court analyzes administra·
tive interpretations of statutes). See also infra Part III.E (discussing SWANCG).
17 Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 172·73; Johnson, supra note 14, at 10673 (discussing
constitutional impact of SWANCG); Moiseyev, supra note 14, at 195 C'Although the Court did
not reach the Commerce Clause challenge to the Migratory Bird Rule, it did suggest that the
Corps' interpretation breached the outer limits of congressional authority.").
18 Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 173 C'[U]nless Congress conveys its purpose clearly,
it will not be deemed to have significantly changed the federal·state balance" (quoting United
States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971»).
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In Babbitt v. Sw~et Home Chapter of Communities for a Great
Oregon ("Sweet Home"),19 the Court itself upheld the Secretary of
Interior's broad interpretation of its regulatory authority over
private landowners. 2o Accordingly, if a private landowner or a state
challenges restrictions on the taking of endangered or threatened
species, including destruction of their critical habitat, the Court will
likely have to address whether the statute's application to intrastate
species that lack significant commercial value is constitutional
under the Commerce Clause.
After the Supreme Court decided Lopez, a number of commentators speculated about its impact on the Endangered Species Act. 21
This Article reexamines the issue in light of Morrison and
SWANCC. Part V demonstrates that, even after Lopez, Morrison,
and SWANCC, the Commerce Clause reaches federal regulation of
intrastate endangered or threatened species because conservation
of such species has traditionally been a shared federal and state
function that recognizes the legitimacy of federal regulation
whenever the need for preservation is great and states have failed
to address important conservation issues. 22 Additionally, Part V
shows federal regulation of endangered or threatened species does
not undermine states' traditional role in regulating non-threatened
species. 23 Finally, Part VI establishes that the preservation of
endangered or threatened species serves long-range national
economic interests in preserving biodiversity and potentially
valuable genetic material that deserve deference from courts even

19

515 u.S. 687 (1995).

20

Id. at 696.708.

21 See generally Johnson, United States v. Lopez: A Misstep, supra note 6, at 66·71
(examining constitutionality of certain provisions of ESA after Lopez); White, supra note 6,
at 240·53 (applying Lopez to ESA); DavidA. Linehan, Note, Endangered Regulation: Why the
Commerce Clause May No Longer Be Suitable Habitat for Endangered Species and Wetlands
Regulation, 2 TEX. REv. L. & POL. 365, 419·27 (1998) (arguing ESA infringes on u[l]and use
regulation ... [which] is traditionally within the expertise of the states and their local
political subdivisions, not Washington, D.C."); Scalero, Note, supra note 6, at 331·49
(discussing court decision since Lopez regarding endangered species and concluding whether
Lopez is ureal threat" to environmental regulation "can only be tested with time.").
22 See infra notes 296·310 and accompanying text (analyzing traditional state activities).
23 See infra notes 357·72 and accompanying text (arguing ESAdoes not blur line between
federal and state authority).
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though their exact value is unascertainable at present. 24 Applying
a rational basis test, Part VI concludes that courts should defer to
Congress' goal of preserving our genetic and biological heritage as
a rea"sonable policy substantially advancing America's long-term
commercial goalS. 25 In light of their concurring opinion in Lopez and
support for protection of endangered species on private lands in
Sweet Home, Justices O'Connor and Kennedy may provide key
swing votes if the Court is to take a more deferential approach to
federal regulation of intrastate endangered species under the
Commerce Clause. 26

II.

ENDANGERED SPECIES Ac:r

A. THE STATUTORY SCHEME
The current Endangered Species Act applies to endangered or
threatened species of fish and wildlife on all land in the United
States and territorial seas. 27 By contrast, the Endangered Species
Acts of 1966 and 1969 protected species on federal land only, and,
as a result, had failed to address the growing problem of species
extinction. 28 In response to these concerns, Congress amended the

2.

See infra notes 429·38 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 373·438 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 67·68 and accompanying text (discussing moderate positions taken of
these justices in previous cases).
27 Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 698
(1995). However, endangered or threatened plants are only protected on federallands or non·
federallandcovered by a state statute. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(2)(B)(1994). See generally George
Cameron Coggins & Anne Fleishel Harris, The Greening of American Law: The Recent
Evolution ofFederal Law for Preserving Floral Diversity, 27 NAT. REsOURCESJ. 247,278·304
(1987) (discussing ESA's limited protection of plants).
28 The Endangered Species Act of 1966 established a National Wildlife Refuge System
and prohibited disturbing animals or habitat within the System. Pub. L. No. 89·669, § 4, 80
Stat. 926, 927-29 (1966). The Endangered Species Act of 1969 required the Secretary of the
Interior to develop a list of endangered species and prohibited the importation of these
animals or any of their bypro ducts without a permit. Pub. L. No. 91·135, §§ 2·3(a), 83 Stat.
275, 275 (1969). These statutes also required federal agencies to conserve species "insofar as
is practicable," Pub. L. No. 89·669, § 1(b), 80 Stat. 926, 926 (1966), and to the "extent
practicable," § 3(a), 83 Stat. at 275. See Davina Karl Kalle, Note, Evolution of Wildlife
Legislation in the United States: An Analysis of the Legal Efforts to Protect Endangered
Species and the Prospects for the Future, 5 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 448, 449·54 (1993)
(outlining 1966 and 1969 Acts).
2S
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ESA in 1973 to prohibit takings of endangered species on all land in
the United States, including state, municipal, or private land. 29 In
TVA v. Hill, so the Supreme Court described the 1973 Act as "the
most comprehensive legislation for the preservation of endangered
species ever enacted by any nation."Sl According to the Hill Court,
"[t] he plain intent of Congress in enacting [the ESA] was to halt and
reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost. This
is reflected not only in the stated policies of the Act, but in literally
every section of the statute."S2 For example, section 2 of the Act
provides that op.e of its main purposes is "to provide a means
whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and
threatened species depend may be conserved... ."S3
To a significant extent, Congress relied on its Commerce Power
as a basis for enacting the 1973 ESA Amendments. For instance,
the statute states that many of the species threatened with
extinction are of "esthetic, ecological, educational, historical,
recreational, and- scientific value to the Nation and its people."s4
The statute also observes that "various species offish, wildlife, and
plants in the United States have been rendered extinct as a
consequence of economic growth and development untempered by
adequate concern and conservation."35
In the 1973 ESA's legislative history, Congress emphasized the
potential future economic and medical benefits of preserving a wide
variety of species and genetic heritage. 36 The House Report
explained:
As we homogenize the habitats in which these plants
and animals evolved, and as we increase the pressure
16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1) (1994); Kaile, supra note 28, at 556.
437 U.S. 153 (1978).
31 Id. at 180.
32 Id. at 184.
33 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (1994); Babbittv. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great
Or., 515 U.S. 687, 698 (1995).
:u 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(3).
as Id. § 1531(a)(l).
36 See Nat'l ABs'n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1050 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
e[O]ne of the primary reasons that Congress sought to protect endangered species from
'takings' was the importance of continuing availability of a wide variety of species to
interstates commerce.").
29

30
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for products that they are in a position to supply
(usually unwillingly) we threaten their-and our
own-genetic heritage.
The value of this genetic heritage is, quite literally, incalculable ....
Who knows, or can say, what potential cures for
cancer or other scourges, present or future, may lie
locked up in the structures of plants which may yet
be undiscovered, much less analyzed? More to the
point, who is prepared to risk being [sic] those potential cures by eliminating those plants for all time?
Sheer self-interest impels us to be cautious. 37
The ESA requires the Secretary of Interior to determine which
species are "in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant
portion of [their] range."38 Then the Secretary must establish a list
of all "endangered" and "threatened" species, and also identify
critical habitat necessary for the survival of such species. 39 The
Secretary next determines whether a species is endangered or
threatened "solely on the basis of the best scientific and commercial
data available to him after conducting a review of the status of the

37

H.R. REP. No. 93·412, at 4·5 (1973). Similarly, the Senate Report on the 1969 ESA

noted:
From a pragmatic point of view, the protection of an endangered species
of wildlife with some commercial value may permit the regeneration of
that species to a level where controlled exploitation of that species can be
resumed. In such a case businessmen may profit from the trading and
marketing of that species for an indefinite number of years, where
otherwise it would have been completely eliminated from commercial
channels in a very brief span of time. Potentially more important,
however, is the fact that with each species we eliminate, we reduce the
[genetic] pool ... available for use by man in future years. Since each
living species and subspecies has developed in a unique way to adapt itself
to the difficulty of living in the world's environment, as a species is lost,
its distinctive gene material, which may subsequently prove invaluable to
mankind in improving domestic animals or increasing resistance to
disease or environmental contaminant, is also irretrievably lost.
S. REP. No. 91-526, at 3 (1969).
38 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6). The Secretary of Commerce also plays a role. Id.
39 Id. § 1533(a).
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species ...."40 Only after determining that a species is endangered
or threatened can the Secretary issue a regulation protecting it.41
Then, the Secretary must develop recovery plans for the "conservation and survival" of listed species. 42 Once a species has recovered
and its survival is no longer threatened, federal regulatory control
ceases, and, accordingly, the animal is subject only to state author.ty 43
1 .
The ESA's regulation of federal lands, its authorization for the·
acquisition of land to support conservation efforts, and its restrictions on the behavior of federal agencies does not raise any serious
constitutional concerns under either the Spending Clause44 or the
Property Clause. 45 Under section 5 of the ESA, the Secretary may
acquire land to assist in the preservation of such species, and
section 6 provides that the Secretary should do so in cooperation
with the States. 46 Section 7 of the ESA directs federal agencies to
"insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by [such
agency ... is not likely to] jeopardize the continued existence of
[endangered species or threatened species] or result in the destruction or modification of [critical] habitat."47 Under this section, all
federal agencies must consult with the Secretary before undertaking
projects that could harm endangered or threatened species or their
critical habitat. 48
Section 9 is the most controversial portion of the ESA because it
extends the Act's coverage to non-federal lands, including private

40

~l
42

Id. § 1533(b)(l)(A).
Id. § 1533(d).
Id. § 1533(f).

~3 Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 438, 503 (4th Cir. 2000).
~~ See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (detailing Congress's spending power); White,

supra

note 6, at 223 (observing certain provisions in ESA are valid pursuant to Spending Clause).
See generally South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 212 (1987) (permitting Congress to
condition funds on State's adoption of minimum drinking age); Denis Binder, The Spending
Clause as a Positive Source ofEnvironmental Protection: A Primer, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 147 (2001)
(discussing how Spending Clause can validate environmental legislation).
.s See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (detailing Congress's control over federal lands);
Sophie Akins, Note, Congress' Property Clause Power to Prohibit Taking Endangered Species,
28 HAsTINGS CONST. L.Q. 167, 183·86 (2000) (noting Congress's broad authority over both
private and public land under Property Clause).
.j6 16 U.S.C. §§ 1534, 1535(a) (1994).
~7 Id. § 1536(a)(2).
.j6 Id. § 1536(a)(3); TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 172·73 (1978).
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property. Section 9(a)(1) prohibits any person from taking any
endangered or threatened species without a permit or other
authorization. 49 The statute defines the term "take" to include any
private activities "to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill,
trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such
conduct.,,5o Any person who knowingly destroys the critical habitat
of an endangered species is subject to criminal penalties-up to a
fine of $50,000, one year in prison or both. 51
To implement section 9(a)(1)'s prohibition against taking
endangered species, the Fish and Wildlife Service ("FWS") of the
Department of Interior has issued regulations forbidding "significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or
injures wildlife."52 In other words, private landowners may not
destroy the critical habitat of endangered species. However, a
landowner may apply for an incidental takings permit that allows
some incidental harm to endangered species from habitat modification if the owner presents an acceptable habitat conservation plan
that demonstrates that the modification is consistent with the longterm survival of the species. 53
B. SWEET HOME

In Sweet Home,54 decided two months after the Lopez decision,
the Supreme Court upheld regulations prohibiting private landowners from destroying critical habitat and indirectly taking endangered species unless they obtain an incidental taking permit. 55
Justice Stevens' majority opinion concluded that regulation was
consistent with section 9(a)(1)'s text and the goals of the Endangered Species Act. 66 First, the Court used the dictionary definition

49 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B).
wId. § 1532(19).
51 Id. § 1540(b).
52 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2001).
53 See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B) ("[I]fsuch taking is incidental to, and not the purpose of,

the carrying out of an otherwise lawful activity.").
54 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
55 Id. at 696-708.
sa Id. at 697-99. See Bradford C. Mank, Is a Textualist Approach to Statutory
Interpretation Pro-Environmentalist?: Why Pragmatic Agency Decisionmaking is Better Than
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of the verb form of "harm" to find that the regulation's inclusion of
indirect harm to endangered species from destruction or harm to the
species' critical habitat was consistent with the "ordinary understanding" of the word and that such a definition "naturally encompasses habitat modification that results in actual injury or death to
members of an endangered or threatened species."57 According to
the Court, "the broad purpose of the ESA supports the Secretary's
decision to extend protection against activities that cause the
precise harms Congress enacted the statute to avoid."58 Additionally, the Court determined that Congress' addition in 1982 of the
section 10 "incidental take" permit provision,59 which allows the
Secretary to grant an exception to the section 9(a)(1)(B) takings
prohibition by granting permits activities that will cause incidental
harm to an endangered species if the applicant provides a satisfactory conservation plan for minimizing any such harm, was evidence
that Congress understood the Act to apply to indirect as well as
direct harm because the most likely use for such a permit was to
avert liability for habitat modification. 6o Finally, the Court invoked
the Chevron deference principle-that courts should defer to an
agency's interpretation if a statute is ambiguous and the interpretation is reasonable. 61 The Court stated that "[t]he latitude the ESA
gives the Secretary in enforcing the statute, together with the
degree of regulatory expertise necessary to its enforcement,
establishes that we owe some degree of deference to the Secretary's
reasonable interpretation," and that "[w]hen it enacted the ESA,
Congress delegated broad administrative and interpretive power to
the Secretary. . .. The proper interpretation of a term such as
'harm' involves a complex policy choice."62 The Court concluded:
''When Congress has entrusted the Secretary with broad discretion,
we are especially reluctant to substitute our views of wise policy for

Judicial Literalism, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1231, 1263-64 (1996) (examining Sweet Home
decision from textualist approach).
57 Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 697-98.
sa Id. at 698.99.
59 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B).
60 Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 700·01.
61 Id. at 703·08; Mank, supra note 56, at 1265; see generally Chevron U.S.A. v. N at'l Res.
Det: Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (establishing "Chevron" principle).
62 Sw!!et Home, 515 U.S. at 703, 708.
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his.,,63 Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Thomas, wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the
words to "take" and to "harm" as used in the Act could not possibly
mean "habitat modification."64
The five justices who constituted the majority in Lopez, Morrison,
and SWANCC-Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor,
Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas-did not vote together in Sweet Home.
Justice Kennedy joined the majority opinion,65 and Justice O'Connor
concurred in the decision with the understanding that the FWS
regulation was limited to "significant habitat modification that
causes actual, as opposed to hypothetical or speculative, death or
injury to identifiable protected animals."66 While concerned with
preserving the role of states in a federalist system, Justices
O'Connor and Kennedy appear more willing to accept national
regulatory schemes than Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia and
Justice Thomas. 67 As discussed below, Justice Kennedy wrote a
concurring opinion in Lopez, joined by Justice O'Connor, that
arguably took a more moderate approach to judicial review of
legislation under the Commerce Clause. 68 In light of their votes in
Sweet Home and Lopez, Justices Kennedy and O'Connor might be
reluctant to conclude that the regulation that they upheld in Sweet
Home is invalid under the Commerce Clause, although they never
had to address whether the regulation was valid for purely intrastate endangered species as opposed to those that are subject to
interstate transportation or trade.
In both Hill and Sweet Home, the Supreme Court broadly
construed the scope of the ESA. 69 However, neither case directly
addressed whether Congress has the authority under the Commerce
[d. at 708.
[d. at 714-36 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See Mank, supra note 56, at 1265-66 (discussing
dissenting opinion in Sweet Home).
65 Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 688.
66 [d. at 708-09 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
67 See generally Byron Dailey, Note, The Five Faces ofFederalism: A State-Power Quintet
Without a Theory, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1243, 1248-50, 1267-87 & passim (2001)(arguing Justices
O'Connor and Kennedy apply more moderate approach to state rights and national power
issues than Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia and particularly Justice Thomas).
63 See infra notes 102-07 and accompanying text (discuBsing Justice Kennedy's Lopez
concurrence).
69 See supra notes 30-33, 55-68 and accompanying text (discussing Hill & Sweet Home).
63
64
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Clause to protect intrastate endangered species that are located on
state, local, or private lands. Many endangered species are located
in only one state, do not cross state lines, and have insignificant
commercial or recreational value. 70
III. THE SUPREME COURT NARROWS THE COMMERCE CLAUSE:
LOPEZAND MORRlSON

The Commerce Clause gives Congress the authority to "regulate
Commerce with. foreign Nations, and among the several
States ... .'>71 While the scope of congressional authority to regulate
interstate commerce is often the subject of litigation, courts have
been especially concerned with whether various intrastate activities
sufficiently affect interstate commerce to justify federal regulation.
Thus, in determining whether the Commerce Clause authorizes
regulation of various endangered species, the determinative i~sue is
whether those species, either individually or perhaps in the
aggregate, affect inter~tate commerce. However, courts have often
focused on whether an activity or species is purely intrastate, even
though intrastate travel by itself is not determinative in deciding
whether an activity or species substantially affects interstate
commerce.
A. A BRIEF mSTORY OF THE COMMERCE CLAUSE

In Gibbons v. Ogden,72 Chief Justice Marshall first articulated
the notion that Congress had authority under the Commerce Clause
to regulate intrastate activities affecting interstate commerce. 73
10 See, e.g., Nagle, supra note 8, at 182·83 (identifying Peck's cave amphipod, Cowhead
Lake thi chub, and Desert milk·vetch as being among species that are "hard[] to connect to
interstate commerce"); Brignac, supra note 10, at 883·84 (arguing that plants and some
animals on endangered species list have "independent commercial value [that] is highly
speculative at best").
11 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
72 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
73 Id. at 186·98. See also Louis J. Virelli ill & David S. Leibowitz, "Federalism Whether
They Want It or Not": The New Commerce Clause Doctrine and the Future of Federal Civil
Rights Legislation After United States v. Morrison, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 926, 927·29 (2001)
(arguing Justice Marshall's opinion in Gibbons adopted broad interpretation of Commerce
Power); Akins, supra note 45, at 169·71 (arguing Justice Marshall's Gibbons opinion implied
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According to the Gibbons Court, the Commerce Power "is the power
to regulate; that is, to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be
governed. This power, like all others vested in Congress, is
complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and
acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the
constitution.,,74 However, the Court also stated that the Commerce
Clause does not apply to intrastate activities "which are completely
within a particular State, which do not affect other States, and with
which it is not necessary to interfere, for the purpose of executing
some of the general powers of the government."75
Though generally taking an expansive approach to the Commerce
Power, Gibbons was vague enough to allow narrower interpretations
by subsequent courts. Before 1936, the Supreme Court often read
the Commerce Clause narrowly to exclude intrastate manufacturing
activities even if a product later entered interstate commerce on the
grounds that the intrastate manufacturing only indirectly affected
interstate commerce. 76 Beginning in 1937, in the seminal case of
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,77 the Court extended the
breadth of the Commerce Power, holding that intrastate activities
that "have such a close and substantial relation to interstate
commerce that their control is essential or appropriate to protect
that commerce from burdens and obstructions" are within the scope
of the Commerce Clause. 78 After 1937, the Court applied a rational
basis review to legislation enacted pursuant to the Commerce
Clause and did not generally distinguish between activities that

Commerce Power reaches intrastate activities affecting interstate commerce).
7. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 196.
75 [d. at 195; see Akins, supra note 45, at 170 C'The Court ... acknowledged that the
States have the sole ability to regulate completely intrastate Commerce.").
76 See Hammerv. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 271·72 (1918) (holding Commerce Clause did
not authorize child labor laws because intrastate manufacturing is not interstate commerce
even though products later entered interstate commerce), overruled by United States v.
Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 116 (1941); United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. I, 12·13 (1895)
(holding sugar manufacturers were outside Sherman Act because sugar manufacturing was
intrastate activity even if sugar later entered interstate commerce).
77 310 U.S. 1 (1937).
78 [d. at 37. Compare id. at 36-39 (holding statute prohibiting unfair labor practices is
within Commerce Power), with Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 310-11 (1936)
(rejecting similar labor laws in Bituminous Coal Conservation Act as exceeding Commerce
Power). See generally White, supra note 6, at 235 (describing court's deference to Congress
in legislating based on Commerce Clause).
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directly or indirectly affected interstate commerce. 79 From 1937 to
1995, the Supreme Court deferentially reviewed most regulatory
laws enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause to the point that the
limitations of the clause became almost a nonissue. so
In Wickard v. Filburn, S1 the Court broadly construed the scope of
the Commerce Clause in holding that the federal government could
forbid a farmer from growing wheat exclusively for home use
because homegrown wheat competes with wheat in interstate
commerce. S2 Wickard is notable both for the Court's willingness to
find that a purely intrastate activity co~d substantially affect
interstate commerce and for its willingness to aggregate small
individual effects in determining the activity's impact. S3 The
Wickard Court concluded that the Commerce Power reaches
individually insignificant activities that have a substantial economic
impact when aggregated "together with that of many others
similarly situated."s4 In Lopez, Chief Justice Rehnquist referred to
Wickard as "perhaps the most far reaching example of Commerce
Clause authority over intrastate activity."s5 Under Wickard, a very
wide range ofintrastate activities might qualify for regulation under
the Commerce Clause.
Recently, the Supreme Court has generally sought to limit the
Commerce Power to legislation regulating "economic" activities that
have a substantial impact on ,interstate commercial matters,
'19 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 606' (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting) (stating
Court's finding in Jones & Mclaughlin Steel has "since ,been seen beginning the abandonment, in practical purposes, ofthe formalistic distinction between direct and indirect effects");
Christy H. Dral & Jerry J. Phillips, Commerce by Another Name: Lopez, Morrison, SWANCC,
and Gibbs, 31 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. lnst.) 10413, 10413 (News & Analysis) (Apr. 2001).
80 See, e.g., Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & ReclamationAss'n, 452 U.S. 264, 281-83 (1981)
(approving under Commerce Power federal regulation of intrastate mining activities under
the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 to prevent ruinous competition
among states likely to lead to inadequate environmental standards); Heart of Atlanta Motel,
Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261 (1964) (upholding use of Commerce Power to enact
civil rights legislation prohibiting racial discrimination in public accommodations); Brignac,
supra note 10, at 874 ("After the Court's decision in NLRB, the Commerce Clause was a
virtual blank check that Congress could use to pass almost any legislation."); Dral & Phillips,
supra note 79, at 10413 (pointing out "broad and sweeping power of Congress to legislate").
81 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
82 [d. at 125-30.
83 [d. at 123-30.
81 [d. at 128.
as United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560 (1995).
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although the line between economic and noneconomic issues is often
not clear. 86 Additionally, the Court is especially likely to scrutinize
federal regulations that infringe on areas of traditional state
concerns, such as criminal or family law, even if Congress makes
findings about their indirect economic impact on the national
economy.87
B. LOPEZ

In United States v. Lopez,88 the Supreme Court, for the first time
since 1936, held a federal statute unconstitutional under the
Commerce Clause. 89 The Lopez Court held that the Gun-Free School
Zones Act of 1990 ("GFSZA"), which made possession of a gun
within a school zone a federal offense, exceeded Congress' authority
under the Commerce Clause despite congressional findings that
violent crime affects interstate commerce. 90
Chief Justice
Rehnquist's majority opinion narrowly read the scope of the
Commerce Clause by limiting congressional authority to "economic
activity" that has substantial effects on interstate commerce. 91
Analyzing previous Commerce Clause cases, the Lopez Court
explained that Congress could regulate three broad categories of
activity: (1) "the use of the channels of interstate commerce"; (2)
"the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things
in interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from
intrastate activities"; arid (3) "those activities having a substantial
relation to interstate commerce . . . i.e., those activities that
substantially affect interstate commerce.,,92 The Court concluded

86 See id. at 566 (stating such "legal uncertainty" is mandated by enumeration of powers
under Commerce Clause after Lopez and Morrison); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,
608·09 (2000) (describing circumscriptions on Congress's power to legislate under the
Commerce Clause). See generally Dral & Phillips, supra note 79, at 10415·24 (describing
Commerce Clause after Lopez and Morrison).
87 Charles Tiefer, After Morrison, Can Congress Preserve Environmental Laws from
Commerce Clause Challenge?, 30 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Instit.) 10888, 10890 (News &
Analysis) (Oct. 2000).
86 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
89 Id. at 567.68; Funk, supra note 14, at 10763.
90 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559·67.
91 Id. at 559·63; Funk, supra note 14, at 10763.
92 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558·59 (citing Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146. 150 (1971) and
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that possession of a gun is not primarily an economic activity and,
therefore, clearly did not fit the first two categories. 93 Additionally,
the Court determined that gun possession could not be regulated
under the third category as an activity that "substantially affects"
interstate commerce because it was neither commercial in its own
right, nor was it an essential component of interstate economic
activity. 94 Moreover, the Court explained, Congress had made no
specific findings about the effect of gun possession in school zones
on interstate commerce, but only more generalized conclusions
about the impact of violent crime in general on interstate
commerce. 95 Because Congress had no rational basis for finding
that gun possession within school zones has a substantial impact on
interstate commerce, the Court held the statute was unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause. 96 The Court's only concession
was its suggestion that Congress could enact legislation regulating
some intrastate activities that lack a substantial impact on
interstate commerce if the regulatory scheme was "an essential part
of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory
scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were
regulated."97
.
The Court suggested that it would carefully review congressional
authority under the Commerce Clause whenever federal legislation
attempted to regulate areas traditionally controlled by state or local
governments. 98 In Lopez, the Court rejected the "costs of crime" and
"national productivity" justifications for the GFSZA because, under
these theories, it was "difficult to perceive any limitation on federal
power, even in areas such as criminal law enforcement or education
where States historically have been sovereign."99 The Court was
Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 276-77 (1981».
93 See id. at 559 (explaining "first two categories of authority may be quickly disposed of'
when GFSZA is viewed in this framework).
~ See id. at 561 (stating GFSZA is not "an essential part of a larger regulation of
economic activity"); Dral & Philips, supra note 79, at 10414 (discussing shortcomings
highlighted in majority opinion).
95 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562-64.
96 [d. at 567-68.
f17 [d. at 561; Adrian Vermeule, Dialogue, Centralization and the Commerce Clause, 31
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) (News & Analysis) 11334, 11335 (Nov. 2001).
98 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557-68.
99 [d. at 564.
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clearly concerned that an expansive reading of the Commerce
Clause to include noneconomic activities that are traditionally
regulated by states would undermine our federal system of government. 100 The Supreme Court stressed that the regulation of school
zones was within the "general police power" retained by the states
and thus not within the normal scope of the Commerce Clause. 101
In his concurring opinion, which Justice O'Connor joined, Justice
Kennedy took a more "pragmatic" approach to interpreting the
Commerce Clause than the majority and dissenting opinions. 102
Justice Kennedy argued that courts should interpret the outer
boundaries of the Commerce Power in light of the overarching goal
of balancing federal and state authority, especially in noncommercial areas traditionally regulated by states. 103 Because education is
a traditional state concern, Kennedy argued that courts should be
cautious in using the Commerce Clause to authorize federal
legislation that regulates "areas of traditional state concern" upon
which "States lay claim by right of history and expertise."104 In
particular, he contended that one of the great dangers of the federal
government regulating areas of traditional state concern is that "the
boundaries between the spheres offederal and state authority would
blur and political responsibility would become illusory."105 Yet
Justice Kennedy's concurrence implied a broader reading of the
Commerce Power than Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion
100 See id. at 561 n.3, 564, 567-68 (stating that delicate balance of power exists between
state and federal government, and balance is disturbed when Congress enacts legislation
intruding on state policy decisions); accord United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617-19
(2000) (''The Constitution requires a distinction between what is truly national and what is
truly local.").
101 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567 ("To uphold the Government's contentions where, we would
have to pile inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert congressional
authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the
States.").
102 See Ann Althouse, Enforcing Federalism After United States v. Lopez, 38 ARIZ. L. REv.
793,801-04 (1996) (describing Justice Kennedy's "pragmatic" concurrence in Lopez as more
moderate than Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion); Stephen R. McAllister, Essay, Is
There a Judicially Enforceable Limit to Constitutional Power Under the Commerce Clause?,
44 U. KAN. L. REV. 217, 238-42 (1996) (praising Justice Kennedy's "pragmatic" approach to
federalism as model for future cases).
103 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 576·77 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also White, supra note 6, at
238·39 (discussing Justice Kennedy's concurrence).
1~ Lopez, 514 U.S. at 583 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
lOS Id. at 577.
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by suggesting that Congress could regulate noncommercial activities
having a nexus to interstate commerce if the legislation does not
intrude on areas within the traditional state police power. lOG
Because Justices Kennedy and O'Connor are perceived by many as
the key swing votes on Commerce Clause issues, Justice Kennedy's
concurrence suggests that the impact of legislation on the balance
between federal and state authority is ar:t important factor to
consider in addition to whether the regulated activity is commercial
in nature. 107
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Breyer argued that Congress
had a rational basis for finding a substantial relation between the
possession of a gun in a school zone and interstate commerce. 108 He
contended that the majority opinion was inconsistent with several
Court decisions that had sustained legislation that had far less
impact on interstate commerce than the GFSZA. 109 Additionally, he
maintained that the majority's distinction between "commercial"
and "noncommercial" transactions was 'unworkable because of the
difficulty in drawing such a line. 110 Furthermore, he argued that
106 Id. at 578. See White, supra note 6, at 238·39 (analyzing Justice Kennedy's concurring
opinion); Linehan, Note, supra note 21, at 404-05 ("The Act usurped from the states 'their own
judgment in an' area to which States lay claim by right of history and expertise, and it does
so by regulating an activity beyond the realm of commerce in the ordinary and usual sense
of that term.' "); Scalero, Note, supra note 6, at 329 (noting Justice Kennedy's feeling if there
is no infringement on state sovereignty under Commerce Clause, Congress may regulate
noncommercial activity with "nexus to interstate commerce"). Arguably, even Chief Justice
Rehnquist's majority opinion implied that Congress might use the Commerce Power to
regulate noneconomic activities that do not intrude on traditional areas of state control. See
Virelli & Leibowitz, supra note 73, at 954 ('The Court criticized the statute for regulating
non·economic and interfering with existing criminal laws, an area it considered traditionally
•
reserved for the statej.
107 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 576·81 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justices O'Connor and Kennedy
are often swing votes in five·to·fourvotes in the Supreme Court. During the 2000·2001 term,
Justices O'Connor and Kennedy were in the majority in those cases twenty out of twenty· six
cases, the most of any Justices on the Court. See Marcia Coyle, Supreme Court Review, 2000·
2001 Term: Taking Charge, NAT'LL.J., Aug. 6, 2001, at C3 (breaking down voting alignment
for 2000·01 term).
108 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 618 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
109 Id. at 625·27 (citing Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971) (holding federal loan
sharking criminal statute was within Commerce Clause); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S.
294 (1964) (holding Civil Rights Act of 1964 within Commerce Clause), Daniel v. Paul, 395
U.S. 298 (1969) (holding regulation ofintrastate amusement park within Commerce Clause),
and Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (holding regulation ofconsumption of homegrown
wheat within Commerce Clause»; see also Dral & Phillips, supra note 79, at 10414-15.
1\0 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 627·29 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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this distinction was inconsistent with the Constitution because the
Commerce Clause allows regulation of either type of activity as long
as it substantially affects interstate commerce. l l l Finally, Breyer's
dissent contended that the majority was creating "legal uncertainty
in an area of law that, until this case, seemed reasonably well
settled." 112
Justice Souter's dissenting opinion criticized the majority for
departing from the highly deferential rational basis review applied
by the Court since 1937.113 He argued that the Court had returned
to the uncertain pre-1937 jurisprudence by qualifying its rational
basis review depending on whether a subject was commercial or
noncommercial despite the difficulties in classifying many
activities. 114 Furthermore, he contended that the Court had
introduced even more uncertainty by suggesting that its application
of rational basis review would depend on whether a statute dealt
with an area of traditional state regulation Qr contained explicit
factual findings supporting a congressional determination that an
activity substantially affected interstate commerce. 115
C. MORRISON

The Violence Against Women Act ("VAW.N') created a "right to be
free from crimes of violence motivated by gender" and provided a
civil damages remedy for victims of gender-based violence. 116 In
United States v. Morrison,117 the Supreme Court held that the
VAWA, like the GFSZA, was beyond the scope of the Commerce
Clause because the activity was essentially noneconomic and only
indirectly connected to interstate commerce. l1S Following Lopez, the
[d. at 627-28; see also Dral & Phillips, supra note 79, at 10418-21.
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 630.
113 [d. at 603-08 (Souter, J., dissenting).
114 [d. at 608.
115 [d. at 608-11. Justice Souter also dissented in Morrison, discussed below, arguing that
the Court should have applied rational basis review to a statute which provided a civil
damages remedy for victims of gender-based violence. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S.
598, 628-36 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting).
116 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994).
117 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
118 [d. at 613-19. The Court also held that Congress lacked authority under § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment to enact § 13981 of the VAWA, id. at 619-27, butthat issue is beyond
1lI

112
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Morrison Court emphasized that "in those cases where we have
sustained federal regulation of intrastate activity based upon the
activity's substantial effects on interstate commerce, the activity in
question has been some sort of economic endeavor ."119 Additionally,
Morrison emphasized that "the existence of congressional findings
is not sufficient, by itself, to sustain the constitutionality of
Commerce Clause legislation."12o The Court rejected congressional
findings that gender-based violence had impacts on interstate
commerce because the causal chain between such crimes and any
economic impacts was too attenuated. 121 The congressional findings
on the VAWAimproperly"[sought] to follow the but-for causal chain
from the initial occurrence of violent crime (the suppression ofwhich
has always been the prime object of the states' police power) to every
attenuated effect upon interstate commerce."122
Moreover, the Court "reject[ed] the argument that Congress may
regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that
conduct's aggregate effect on interstate commerce.,,123 According to
the Court, permitting aggregation of noneconomic activities as a
basis for regulation under the Commerce Clause would permit the
federal government to regulate virtually every activity.124 Allowing
Congress to justify legislation by aggregating noneconomic activities
under the Commerce Clause would "completely obliterate the
Constitution's distinction between national and local authority.,,125
The Court noted as an example that the aggregation of noneconomic
activities could be applied just as easily "to family law and other
areas of traditional state regulation since the aggregate effect of
marriage, divorce, and childrearing on the national economy is
undoubtedly significant."126 The Court stated that courts should

the scope of this Article.
119 Id. at 611.
120 Id. at 614.
121 Id. at 615-16.
122 Id. at 615.
123 Id.at617.
124 Id. at615-17. "If accepted, petitioners' reasoning would allow Congress to regulate any
crime as long as long as the nationwide, aggregated impact of that crime has substantial
effects on employment, production, transit, or consumption." Id. at 615.
125 Id. at 615.
125 Id. at 615-16.
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limit the aggregation principle to economic activities, 127 emphasizing
that "in every case where [the Court had] sustained federal
regulation under Wickard's aggregation principle, the regulated
activity was of an apparent commercial character." 128 The Morrison
Court found that the VAWA impermissibly intruded on traditional
state authority over family law and criminal issues. 129 The Court
noted that there was "no better example of the police power, which
the Founders denied the National Government and reposed in the
States, than the suppression of violent crime and vindication of its
victims.,,130 As in Lopez, the Morrison court emphasized that courts
should carefully evaluate legislation in view of federalism concerns:
"The Constitution requires a distinction between what is truly
national and what is truly local. ..."131
D. TO WHAT EXTENT DID LOPEZAND MORRISON CHANGE THE POWER OF
CONGRESS UNDER THE COMl\.1ERCE CLAUSE?

Many commentators have criticized Lopez and Morrison for
failing to articulate a clear standard for evaluating the Commerce
Power. 132 The two cases purported to apply a traditional rational
basis standard of review. 1s3 However, the actual standard applied
appears to be far more stringent than previous cases. 134 For
example, the Morrison Court did not defer to congressional findings
127
128

129
130

[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.

at 610-11.
at 611 n.4.
at 618.

at 599.
See, e.g., Dral & Phillips, supra note 79, at 10417-18 (arguing Lopez and Morrison
purported to apply rational basis test for whether legislation is authorized under Commerce
Clause, but in fact applied more stringent and uncertain standard); Jason Everett Goldberg,
Note, Substantial Activity and Non-Economic Commerce: Toward a New Theory of the
Commerce Clause, 9 J.L. & POL'y 563, 571, 594-603 (2001) (arguing Morrison claimed to apply
rational basis review, but actually applied far more stringent standard that it never clearly
articulated).
133 In Morrison, the Court declared: "Due respect for the decisions of a coordinate branch
of Government demands that we invalidate a congressional enactment upon a plain showing
that Congress has exceeded its constitutional bounds." 529 U.S. at 607.
1M Dral & Phillips, supra note 79, at 10417-18; see Brignac, supra note 10, at 881-82
(arguing Supreme Court's rational basis review has paid "lip service" to judicial deference in
recent opinions, but Morrison aggressively reviewed whether activity substantially affects
interstate commerce).
131

132
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that gender-based violence substantially affected interstate
commerce, findings that should have cleared the traditional rational
basis test. 135 By failing to articulate a clear new standard for
reviewing statutes under the Commerce Clause, the Lopez and
Morrison decisions have created considerable uncertainty for lower
courts attempting to follow the Supreme Court's evolving jurisprudence in this area. 136
Because of the differing views about the scope of the Commerce
Power, even among the majority in Lopez and Morrison, the impact
of these decisions for future cases remains uncertain. In his
concurring opinion in Lopez, Justice Thomas stated that he would
return to the "original understanding" of the Commerce Clause
when it was ratified in the late 1780s, which limited the Commerce
Power to transportation of goods across state boundaries. 137 He
argued that the "substantial effects test is but an innovation of the
20th century"13S and suggested that the Court should overrule it. 139
In his concurring opinion in Morrison, Justice Thomas reiterated his
"view that the very notion of a 'substantial effects' test under the
Commerce Clause is inconsistent with the original understanding
of Congress' powers and this Court's early Commerce Clause
cases."140 However, no other justice joined Justice Thomas' Lopez
and Morrison concurrences.
By" contrast, Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in Lopez,
which was joined by Justice O'Connor, clearly approv:ed of the
"substantial effects" test. 141 Justice Kennedy argued that the Court
185 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 607 (stating deferential presumption of constitutionality
standard). See also icl. at 614-15 (declining to defer to congressional finding that genderbased violence substantially affects interstate commerce); Brignac, supra note 10, at 882
(,Morrison therefore demands that the courts not give Congress the benefit of judicial
deference but instead examine the wisdom of its judgment.").
138 See Dral & Phillips, supra note 79, at 10417-18 (criticizing Lopez and Morrison for
using uncertain standard of review); Goldberg, supra note 132, at 606·08 (arguing uncertain
standard of review in Lopez and Morrison has confused lower courts).
137 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 585·602 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(rejecting idea Congress can regulate everYthing that affects interstate commerce); Dailey,
supra note 67, at 1248 (stating Justice Thomas felt Commerce Clause "grants Congress power
to regulate only actual trafficking of merchandise across state borders").
138 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 596.
139 Id. at 584-602 (Thomas, J., concurring); Dailey, supra note 67, at 1248.
140 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 627 (Thomas, J., concurring).
141 Id. at 368.
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could not return to an 18th century conception of the Commerce
Power in light of sixty years of precedent reading that power far
more broadly.142 While accepting the substantial effects standard
applied in numerous cases between 1937 and 1995, Justice Kennedy
interpreted the Commerce Clause in light of federalist principles
that prohibit Congress from enacting legislation that has only
incidental commercial concerns and interferes with traditional state
functions. 143 The current composition of the Supreme Court
suggests that Justice Kennedy's approach to federalism and the
Commerce Clause is more likely to be influential than Justice
Thomas' call for a return to early 19th Century jurisprudence. 144
Nonetheless, there is considerable uncertainty about how the Court
will address future cases involving the Commerce Power.
E. SWANCC

In SWANGG,145 the Supreme Court addressed whether the
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") and the Army Corps of
Engineers ("the Corps") could regulate isolated intrastate waters
and wetlands that are not connected or adjacent to navigable
waters. While not directly relying on Lopez and Morrison, the
SWANGG decision reflects similar concerns with limiting the scope
of the Commerce Clause to economic matters and to protecting
"traditional state power" from "federal encroachment." 146 The Court

1~2 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 570·74 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (describing Court's
development of Commerce Power in past cases); Althouse, supra note 102, at 802 (arguing
Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in Lopez recognized need for modern understanding of
Commerce Power in light of today's economic system); McAllister, supra note 102, at 229
(analyzing Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion); Dailey, supra note 67, at 1248·49 (arguing
Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in Lopez clearly rejected Justice Thomas' proposed
return to 18th century understanding of commerce).
143 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 575·83 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (recognizing duty to protect
federalism and limit Commerce Power).
1~4 See Dailey, supra note 67, at 1286·88 (discussing how five justices-Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas-vote in federalism cases and
arguing Justice Thomas' views about Commerce Power are "extreme").
I~ 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
l.s See Solid Waste Agencyv. United States Corps ofEng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 172·74 (2001)
C'[U]nless Congress conveys its purpose clearly, it will not be deemed to have significantly
changed the federal·state balance.")(quoting United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971)};
Dral & Phillips, supra note 79, at 10421 (noting both Lopez and Morrison sought to maintain
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suggested in dicta that the Corps' regulation of such wetlands raised
serious constitutional questions because states and ~ocal governments had traditionally regulated isolated, non-navigable intrastate
waters.147 Section 404 of the Clean Water Act requires all persons
to obtain a permit from the Corps "for the discharge of dredged or
fill material into the navigable waters at specified disposal sites."148
The Act defines the crucial term "navigable waters" to "mean[] the
waters of the United States, including the territorial seas."149 Both
the EPA and Corps have issued regulations broadly defining the
term "waters of the United States" to include "intrastate lakes,
rivers, streams (including intermittent streams), mudflats,
sandfiats, wetlands, sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows, playa
lakes, or natural ponds, the use, degradation or destruction of which
could affect interstate or foreign commerce ...."150
In 1985, in United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.,151 the
Supreme Court held that the Corps had jurisdiction over nonnavigable wetlands that are adjacent to navigable waters.152 The
Court concluded that jurisdiction existed both because there was
evidence that Congress intended to give the Corps authority over
adjacent wetlands and because such wetlands often have a significant impact on navigable wetlands. 15s However, the Riverside
Bayview Court did not decide whether the Corps could regulate
isolated, intrastate wetlands or waters that are clearly not adjacent
to navigable waters.
There are sound ecological reasons to protect isolated intrastate
wetlands. They are home to many birds and other wetland species,

distinction between national and local power); Johnson, supra note 14, at 10673 (stating broad
reading of Migratory Bird Act would impede on traditional state power).
147 Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 172·74.
148 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (1994).
149 10.. § 1362(7).
1150 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3) (2001) (Corps regulation); 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(s)(3) (2001) (EPA
regulation); Funk, supra note 14, at 10741.
151 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
152 1d. at 132.35.
153 See id. at 129·35 (finding legislative history and policy support Corps' definition of
wetlands); Funk, supra note 14, at 10742·44 (discussing RiversideBayview Homes); Johnson,
supra note 14, at 10672 (arguing Riverside Bayview Homes allowed regulation of many waters
and wetlands that are not navigable in fact). See also Johnson, supra at 10674·75 (discussing
nexus standard for relationship between adjacent wetlands and navigable waters).
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and they often serve as a buffer against local flooding. 154 In 1986,
the Corps issued a regulation claiming to extend its jurisdiction to
isolated, intrastate wetlands or waters that are not adjacent to
navigable waters "based on their actual or potential use as habitat
for migratory birds."155 The so-called "Migratory Bird Rule" stated
that "waters ofthe United States ... also include ... waters [w]hich
are or would be used as habitat by birds protected by Migratory Bird
Treaties; or [w]hich are or would be used as habitat by other
migratory birds which cross state lines."156 The regulation was
based on the premise that the destruction of isolated, intrastate
wetlands would reduce the suitable habitat for migratory birds, and
in turn, the death of many birds from the destruction of these
wetlands would in theory reduce interstate commerce in
birdwatching and bird hunting. 157
Resolving a conflict in the circuit courts,158 the SWANCC Court
held that the migratory bird regulation was invalid because
Congress did not intend to include "isolated" wetlands or waters
within the term "navigable waters," when it enacted the Clear
Water Act. 159 In dicta, the SWANCC Court indicated that regulation
of isolated intrastate wetlands would raise serious questions under
the Commerce Clause because local land use regulation is a
traditional state and local function. 160 While previous cases had
stated that migratory bird protection was a "national interest of
very nearly the first magnitude,"161 the Court found it was "not

I~ See Johnson, supra note 14, at 10670·71 (discussing benefits of isolated wetlands and
impact of SWANCC).
155 Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 51 Fed. Reg. 41,216,
41,217 (Nov. 13, 1986) (codified at 33 C.F.R. pts. 320·30); Funk, supra note 14, at 10741;
Moiseyev, supra note 14, at 193·94.
ISS Final Rule for Regulatory Programs for the Corps of Engineers, 51 Fed. Reg. at 41,217.
157 Id.; Funk, supra note 14, at 10741; Moiseyev, supra note 14, at 193·94.
158 Compare Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. EPA, 999 F.2d 256,262·63 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding
regulation of isolated, intrastate wetlands constitutional under Commerce Clause), and Leslie
Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354, 360 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding regulation to be
constitutional), with United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251,257 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding Corps'
regulation of isolated intrastate wetlands is unconstitutional under Commerce Clause).
159 Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 404(a), Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a)
(1994); Solid Waste Agency v. United States Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 162·63 (2001);
Moiseyev, supra note 14, at 194.
160 Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 172·74; Moiseyev, supra note 14, at 195.
161 Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 173 (quoting Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 435
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clear" whether the regulated activity or object, in the aggregate,
affects interstate commerce. 162 The Court observed that the Clean
Water Act preserves significant local control over water resources
and land use issues. 163 According to the Court, the Clean Water Act
does not "express [ ] a desire to readjust the federal-state balance in
this manner, but instead by enacting the statute Congress chose to
'recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and
rights of States ... to plan the development and use ... ofland and
water resources ... .' ,,164
Because there was no clear statement in the Act indicatmg that
Congress wished to give the federal government authority over
isolated wetlands, the Court refused to broadly interpret the Act to
include "federal jurisdiction over ponds and mudflats falling within
the 'Migratory Bird Rule' [that] would result in a significant
impingement of the States' traditional and primary power over land
and water use."165 Accordingly, the Court "read the statute as
written to avoid the significant constitutional and federalism
questions raised by respondents' interpretation, and therefore
rejected the request for administrative deference."166 The actual
impact of the SWANGC opinion remains uncertain because the line
between isolated, purely intrastate wetlands and those wetlands
that are adjacent to navigable waters is often unclear and depends
in part how the Corps and the EPA define the term "wetlands" and
"navigable waters."167
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens argued that the
majority should have deferred to the Corps' reasonable interpretation of the term "navigable waters" in the Clean Water Act to

(1920».
162 Id. at 173; Moiseyev, supra note 14, at 195.
163 Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 166·67 (noting Clean Water Act preserved "primary
responsibilities and rights of the state to prevent, reduce and eliminate water pollution [and]
to plan the development and use ..• of land and water resources"); Moiseyev, supra note 14,
at 195.
164 Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 174 (quoting Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b)
(1994».
16:1 Id.
166 Id.
167 See Funk, supra note 14, at 10743·45, 10771-72 (arguing future of wetlands regulation
is uncertain because definition of adjacent wetland is not clear); Johnson, supra note 14, at
10676-77 (discussing uncertainty for future of wetland regulation).
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include isolated intrastate wetlands. 16B Additionally, Justice
Stevens contended that Congress may regulate isolated wetlands
inhabited by migratory birds under the Commerce Clause. 169 He
maintained that regulation of isolated wetlands is proper under the
Commerce Clause because, in contrast to the local activities
impermissibly regulated in Lopez and Morrison, "the discharge offill
material into the Nation's waters is almost always undertaken for
economic reasons.,,170 Justice Stevens further argued that the
destruction of isolated wetlands substantially affects interstate
commerce because it significantly harms the migratory bird
population in the aggregate and reduces tourism 171 and that "the
causal connection between the filling of wetlands and the decline of
commercial activities associated with migratory birds is not 'attenuated,' ,,172 but instead "is direct and concrete."I73 Furthermore,
Justice Stevens contended that the Migratory Bird Rule did not blur
the line between national and local activities because the protection
of migratory birds is a national problem that has traditionally been
a federal responsibility.174 Accordingly, Justice Stevens concluded
that regulation of intrastate isolated wetlands could be sustained
under the Commerce Clause solely because of its impact on
interstate migratory birds. 175

168 See Solid WasteAgency, 531 U.S. at 175·92 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (givingjustification
for Corps interpretation of "navigable waters"); see also Moiseyev, supra note 14, at 195
(describing Corp's reasoning for their definition of navigable waters). Justices Souter,
Ginsburg and Breyer joined the dissent. Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 174.
169 Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 192·97 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Moiseyev, supra note
14, at 196.
170 Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 193 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Moiseyev, supra note 14,
at 196.
171 Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 192·95 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Moiseyev, supra note
14, at 196.
172 Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 195 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting United States
v. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 612); Moiseyev, supra note 14, at 196.
173 Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 195 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Gibbs v. Babbitt,
214 F.3d 483, 492·93 (4th Cir. 2000»; Moiseyev, supra note 14, at 196.
174 Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 195·97 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
175 ld.
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F. DOES IT MATTER WHETHER A SPECIES IS INTRASTATE?

Professor Nagle has "questioned the significance of whether a
species is purely intrastate or may cross state lines in determining
whether the species substantially affects interstate commerce. He
asks, "Why the fact that a bird or animal crosses state lines of its
own volition and without being itself an object of interstate commerce is sufficient for Commerce Clause purposes remains unexplained.,,176 For example, what is the constitutional significance of
whether the TIlinois Cave Amphipod lives only in caves in Illinois
instead of living in a couple of caves in Missouri as well?177
Similarly, in Cargill, Inc. v. United States,178 Justice Thomas,
dissenting from the Court's denial of certiorari, stated that the
assumption that "the self- propelled flight of birds across state lines
creates a sufficient interstate nexus to justify the Corps' assertion
of jurisdiction over any standing water that could serve as a habitat
for inigratory birds ... likely stretches Congress' Commerce Clause
powers beyond the breaking point."179 In SWANGG, the Court did
not directly address whether the presence of migratory birds was
sufficient to justify regulation of intrastate, isolated wetlands under
the Commerce Clause, but it stated that such argument "raise[d]
significant constitutional questions[;] [fjor example, we would have
to evaluate the precise object or activity that, in the aggregate,
substantially affects interstate commerce."180 While dicta, this
portion of SWANCC suggests that the fact that a species crosses
state lines does not automatically make its habitat entitled to
protection under the Commerce Clause without further analysis
regarding the relationship of the habitat to the species and commercial activity.

Nagle, supra note 8, at 185 n.49.
See Final Rule to List the Illinois Cave Ampbipod as Endangered, 63 Fed. Reg. 46,900,
46,902 (Sept. 3, 1998) (codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17 (2001» (listing issue 1 as: "The Federal
Government ... does not have the authority to list a species found in only one state, because
regulation of such species does not impact upon interstate commerce."); Nagle, supra note 8,
at 182·83 (stating there is already litigation about whether Illinois Cave Ampbipod affects
interstate commerce).
178 516 U.S. 955 (1995).
179 Id. at 958.
ISO Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 173.
176

177
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Professor Nagle acknowledges that most judges and commentators have assumed that purely intrastate species raise greater
constitutional concerns under the Commerce Clause than those that
travel interstate. 181 As is discussed in Part IV.A, in National Ass'n
of Home Builders v. Babbitt ("Home Builders"),182 a three-judge
panel of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
appeared to attach significance to the fact that the endangered
Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly was a purely intrastate species. 183
Remember that in Wickard, the fact that the wheat was grown
solely in one state did not prevent the Court from finding that the
federal government could regulate intrastate activities that affect
interstate commerce. 184 · It is significant that Chief Justice
Rehnquist in Lopez remarked on the extraordinary breadth of
Wickard precisely because the intrastate nature of the activity
involved in the case has made it a landmark for establishing the
outer limits of the Commerce Clause. 185 Before 1937, the Supreme
Court often distinguished interstate commerce from intrastate
manufacturing activities that it viewed as beyond the scope of the
Commerce Clause. 18s Thus, courts have treated whether an activity
is intrastate as an important factor,187 although Professor Nagle
may well be correct that they have exaggerated its significance.
Whether a species is located in one state should be a factor, but
not dispositive, in deciding whether it substantially affects interstate commerce. Wickard establishes that intrastate activities can

Nagle, supra note 8, at 185 nA9.
130 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
183 See infra notes 192-99 and accompanying text (explaining Congress was allowed to
prohibit private taking of Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly under Commerce Clause even
though it existed in only one state).
184 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127 (1942).
185 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560 (1995) (calling Wickard "perhaps the most
far reaching example of Commerce Clause authority over intrastate activity").
186 See Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251,276-77 (1918) (holding Commerce Clause did
not authorize child labor laws because intrastate manufacturing is not interstate commerce
even though products later entered interstate commerce), overruled by United States v.
Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 116-17 (1941); United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895)
(holding sugar manufacturers were outside Sherman Act because sugar manufacturing was
intrastate activity even if sugar later entered interstate commerce).
187 For example, the Supreme Court in Lopez rejected congressional regulation of
intrastate possession of a gun, but undoubtedly would have approved legislation prohibiting
interstate transport of that same gun. See Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559-67.
181

182
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affect interstate commerce sufficiently to fall within the ambit of the
Commerce Clause. 188 On the other hand, the fact that a speqies
crosses interstate lines or is located in more than one state does not
automatically mean that it has significant commercial value. The
Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly has little immediate commercial
value whether it is located in one state or two, or whether it
occasionally flies across state borders. 189 Nevertheless, whether a
species crosses state boundaries has been an,d should be a factor in
evaluating whether it affects interstate commerce. For example,
whether a species crosses state boundaries may affect the extent to
which it is an object of tourism, affects agriculture, or contributes to
biodiversity.19o As discussed below, whether a species crosses state
lines could be a factor when courts addrEilss such issues as whether
Congress has the authority to regulate destructive competition
among states or to aggregate species together in determining
whether they affect" interstate commerce. 191
Regardless of whether an endangered species is located in one
state is an important distinction, there is still the issue of whether
the Commerce Clause authorizes Congress to protect the many
endangered and threatened species that lack immediate commercial
value. To what extent may Congress consider a species potential
medical or genetic benefits? Is it appropriate to aggregate commercially valuable species with those that have little value?

Wickard, 317 U.S. 111 at 123-30.
See Nagle, supra note 8, at 182-83 (arguing many endangered species lack any
commercial value).
190 Apparently intrastate species may have significant economic impacts, but all things
being equal, an interstate species can potentially affect a wider range of people and other
animals. For example, in Gibbs 11. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied sub
nom., Gibbs 11. Norron, 531 U.S. 1145 (2001), the court discussed the wide-ranging economic
and commercial impacts of red wolves. See generally infra notes 261-95 (discussing Gibbs 11.
Babbitt).
191 See generally infra notes 375-438 and accompanying text (discussing argument in favor
of aggregation).
188
189
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IV. LOWER COURT DECISIONS ADDRESSING THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE ESA: GIBBS AND
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF HOME BUILDERS

Despite the Supreme Court's recent trend to narrow the scope of
congressional authority under the Commerce Clause, both the
Fourth and the District of Columbia Circuits have held that
Congress may regulate intrastate species under the ESA. Both
circuits relied on congressional findings that protecting endangered
species may have a significant effect on preserving genetic and
biodiversity resources in concluding that protecting intrastate
species is significant economic activity encompassed by the Commerce Clause. However, in light of Morrison and SWANCC, there
is a serious question whether Congress may regulate intrastate
endangered species that currently generate little or no interstate
commerce. There are also serious questions about whether federal
regulation of intrastate endangered species impermissibly intrudes
on traditional state and local control over land usage.
A. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF HOMEBUILDERS

In National Ass'n of Home Builders v. Babbitt,192 by a fractured
two-to-one decision, the D.C. Circuit held that Congress had
authority under the Commerce Clause to prohibit the private taking
of an endangered species that existed in only one state and did not
directly generate any significant interstate commerce. 193 As a result
of commercial development and pollution, the habitat of the Delhi
Sands Flower-Loving Fly ("the fly") was apparently limited to a
forty-square-mile area entirely within the state of California. 194
There was no significant interstate trade in or transportation ofthe
fly.195 The construction of roads to a proposed hospital would have
destroyed most of the fly's habitat and possibly the entire population
of the endangered fly.196 The Fish and Wildlife Service ("FWS")

192
193
194

195

196

130 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
Id. at 1046-49.
Id. at 1043-44.
Id.; Brignac, supra note 10, at 884.
Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1044-45.
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determined that the proposed road construction was a "taking" of
endangered species under section 9(a)(1).197 The developers argued
that the federal government did not have the authority under the
Commerce Clause to regulate the use of private lands to protect the
fly because it is found only within a single state. 198 They contended
that "the Constitution of the United States does not grant the
federal government the authority to regulate wildlife, nor does it
authorize federal regulation of non-federallands."199
1. Judge Wald's Opinion. By a two-to-one vote, Home Builders
upheld the constitutionality of the ESA as applied to the fly,200 but
the two judges in the majority disagreed about the grounds for
finding authority under the Commerce Power. In her opinion, Judge
Wald argued that the ESA was constitutional under the first and
. third categories of interstate regulation outlined in Lopez: "channels of commerce" and activity "substantially affecting" interstate
commerce. 201 Initially, she concluded that section 9(a)(1)'s prohibition against "takings" of endangered spec~es meets the first prong
of the Lopez test-whether an activity affected the "channels of
interstate commerce" through an extension of the Wickard aggregation rule. According to Judge Wald, "we may look not only to the
effect of the extinction of the individual endangered species at issue
in this case, but also to the aggregate effect of the extinction of all
similarly situated endangered species.,,202 Judge Wald argued that
the prohibition against taking endangered species is necessary to
achieve the government's regulation of transportation of endangered
species. 20s Like laws forbidding the transfer and possession of
machine guns, the takings prohibition was necessary to control
interstate trafficking of endangered species. 204 The takings
prohibition was within Congress' authority to "keep the channels of
interstate commerce free from immoral and injurious uses," akin to

197

198
199

200
201
202

203
2(U

Id. at 1044.
Id. at 1045.
Id.
Id. at 1057 (holding regulation offly is constitutional under Commerce Clause).
Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1046; Scalera, supra note 6, at 337.
Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1046.
Id.
Id. at 1047; Scalera, supra note 6, at 337.
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other prohibited noxious or harmful behaviors, such as racial
discrimination and unfair labor practices. 205
Judge Wald also concluded that the takings prohibition in the
ESA meets Lopezs third prong-activities that have substantial
impacts on interstate commerce. 206 Judge Wald interpreted the
prong to include commercial or noncommercial activities alike,207
although some would question whether the Lopez Court was as
willing to so readily include noneconomic impacts. 208 She deferred
to congressional findings in the ESA's 1973 legislative history about
the value of biodiversity and the potential for future medical uses
from a wide range of endangered species in concluding that "takings
[of endangered species] ... would have a substantial effect on
interstate commerce by depriving commercial actors of access to an
important natural resource-biodiversity."209
By preserving
biodiversity, the ESA produces significant current .and future
economic benefits to interstate commerce by preserving genetic
diversity and conserving genetic resources that may have future
medical value. 210
Judge Wald concluded that, each time a species becomes extinct
and the pool of wild species decreases, the extinction "has a
substantial effect on interstate commerce by diminishing a natural
resource that could otherwise be used for present and future
commercial purpose.,,211 She acknowledged that the full value of
many plants and animals is uncertain but nonetheless concluded
that each endangered species is entitled to protection because "[a]
species whose worth is still unmeasured has what economists call

2Il6 Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1048-49 (citing Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United
States, 379 U.S. 214, 246 (1964) (upholding use of Commerce Power to enact civil rights
legislation prohibiting racial discrimination in public accommodations), United States v.
Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 113-14 (1941) (upholding use of Commerce Power to enact legislation
requiring employers to adopt minimum wage and maximum hour limitations»; Scalero, supra
note 6, at 337-38.
206 Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1049.
2IJ7 Id.
208 See Linehan, supra note 21, at 421-22 (arguing Judge Wald's broad approach to
evaluating noncommercial impact such as biodiversity was more consistent with Justices
Breyer and Souter's dissenting opinions in Lopez than majority opinion).
208 Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1052-54; Scalero, supra note 6, at 338.
210 Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1052-53.
211 Id. at 1053.
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an 'option value'-the value of the possibility that a future discovery
will make useful a species that is currently thought of as useless."212
She continued, "To allow even a single species whose value is not
currently apparent to become extinct therefore deprives the economy
of the option value of that species.,,213 In the aggregate, she
concluded, the extinction of endangered species had a substantial
effect on interstate commerce.214
However, there are serious problems with Judge Wald's aggregation of all endangered and threatened species in assessing whether:
a particular endangered species has a substantial effect on interstate commerce. By aggregating the benefits of all endangered
species, Judge Wald could defend the protection of any endangered
species no matter how attenuated its relationship to interstate
commerce. 215 In particular, Judge Wald used the" aggregation
approach to justify preservation of an isolated fly population without
having to demonstrate that the species has any economic value now
or is likely to in the future. 216 Such aggregation is arguably
appropriate only if there is a significant relationship among
different endangered species, resulting in their having a substantial
cumulative impact on interstate commerce, although less significant
impacts satisfy the requirement if they cannot be easily separated
from a comprehensive scheme essential to the promotion of commerce. 217 As discussed in Part VI, a possible justification for a broad
aggregation principle for all endangered and threatened species
would be deference to congressional findings in the ESA's legislative
history.218

212 Id. (citing Bryan Nolan, Commodity, Amenity, and Morality:
The Limits of
Quantification in Valuing Biodiveristy, in BIODIVERSITY 200, 202 (Edward O. Wilson ed.,
1988».
213 Id.
21. Id. at 1053.54.
215 See Akins, supra note 45, at 180·81 (concluding "connection between the regulated
activity and interstate commerce is too attenuated").
216 See Nagle, supra note 8, at 183·84.
217 See infra notes 433·38 and accompanying text (discussing implications of aggregation
if broader regulatory scheme).
218 See infra notes 415·28 and accompanying text (discussing need for deference to
congressional finding).
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Judge Wald also argued that Congress has the power under the
Commerce Clause to regulate destructive economic competition. 219
Accordingly, she concluded that Congress could regulate intrastate
endangered species if economic competition among states was likely
to prevent them from providing adequate protection to such
species. 220 The issue of when Congress may regulate activities to
prevent a "race to the bottom" by competing states will be discussed
below in Part V.B.221
2. Judge Henderson's Concurring Opinion. Concurring with the
court's judgment, Judge Henderson agreed with Judge Wald that
the taking prohibition in section 9(a)(1) of the ESA is valid under
the Commerce Clause. 222 However, Judge Henderson reached her
conclusion by a somewhat different reasoning process. First, she
disagreed with Judge Wald's claim that the statute regulates
channels of commerce because endangered species, unlike machine
guns or lumber, are not commercially marketable goods. 223 Second,
Judge Henderson questioned whether the ESA's protection of
biodiversity would have a substantial impact on interstate commerce because of the loss of potential medical or economic benefit.224
She criticized Judge Wald's biodiversity theory because the medical
and economic benefits of preserving biodiversity are too speculative
to meet Lopezs substantial effect on interstate commerce test.225
In concluding that the Commerce Clause reached the FWS'
regulation of the fly, Judge Henderson determined that "the loss of
biodiversity itself has a substantial effect on our ecosystem and
likewise on interstate commerce.,,226 She contended that "[given] the
interconnectedness of species and ecosystems, it is reasonable to
conclude that the extinction of one species affects others and their
ecosystems and that the protection of a purely intrastate species ...
will therefore substantially affect land and objects that are involved

219

Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1054-57.

220

[d.

221
222
223

22'
22.1
226

See infra notes 340·56 and accompanying text.
at 1057 (Henderson, J., concurring).
at 1057.58.
at 1058.

[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.

at 1058-59.
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in interstate commerce."227 Accordingly, she maintained that there
is a rational basis to believe that the taking of an endangered
species substantially affects interstate commerce and that section
9(a)(1) is within the commerce power of Congress. 228 However,
Judge Henderson presented no evidence about how the extinction of
the fly might affect other species or interstate commerce.
Alternatively, Judge Henderson concluded that the destructive
impact of the hospital construction on the fly's habitat substantially
affected interstate commerce. 229 By requiring consideration of how
such construction will affect endangered species like the fly, the
ESA "relates to both the proposed redesigned traffic intersection and
the hospital it is intended to serve, each of which has an obvious
connection with interstate commerce."230 Thus, even if the fly itself
is not in interstate commerce, the hospital construction is clearly a
commercial activity that directly affects the habitat of the fly.
Arguably, the relationship between the construction of the hospital
and the destruction of the fly's habitat is relatively,direct and should
be enough to bring the protection of the fly within the Commerce
Clause. 231
3. Judge Sentelle's Dissenting Opinion. In his dissent, Judge
Sentelle contended that section 9(a)(1)(B) of the ESAis unconstitutional under Lope~s three-part standard because the statute does
not regulate commerce. 232 Evaluated under Lope~s first prong, the
ESA does not affect use of the channels of interstate commerce
because the fly does not engage in interstate trave1. 233 Considering
the second prong of Lopez, whether a regulation governs found "the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce," Judge Sentelle found the
ESA deficient because it does not control a commercial activity.234
Id. at 1059.
Id. (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 549, 557·59 (1995».
229 Id.
230 Id. See also Linehan, supra note 21, at 422·24 (arguing Commerce Clause does not
encompass protection of noncommercial activities such as protection of fly simply because
there is some connection to commercial enterprise).
231 See Nagle, supra note 8, at 189·91, 208-14 (discussing choice of activity problem,
whether focus should be on fly's impact on interstate commerce or hospital construction's
impact).
232 Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1061-62 (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
233 Id. at 1063.
2M Id. at 1062.
227

228
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Further, as a secondary matter, the ESA contains no jurisdictional
provision limiting it scope to regulate only activities affecting
interstate commerce. 235 Under Lopezs third prong, whether an
activity has substantial effects on interstate commerce, Judge
Sentelle agreed with Judge Henderson's concurrence, concluding
that Judge Wald's argument about the potential medical value of
protecting biodiversity is too speculative to support congressional
regulation under the Commerce Clause. 236
Judge Sentelle also argued that Judge Henderson's ecosystem
argument was too far removed from commerce in light of the
Supreme Court's requirement in Lopez that regulation must
substantially affect commercial concerns.237 According to Judge
Sentelle, if there was a sufficient connection between the hospital
construction's involvement with articles of commerce and the
incidental result of the construction destroying the fly's habitat
there no "stopping point" in defining the Commerce
Power-Congress could regulate any noncommercial activity that
has some impact on or is affected in some way by articles in
interstate commerce. 238 Thus, the fly was simply not an article in
interstate commerce and, therefore, not within the Commerce
Power.239
4. Is Home Builders Consistent with Lopez, Morrison and
SWANCC? The Home Builders case was decided after Lopez, but
before Morrison and SWANCC. Judge Sentelle clearly believed that
the majority's decision was inconsistent with both the spirit and
letter of Lopez. 240 The subsequent Morrison and SWANCC decisions
do not explicitly resolve the questions at issue in Home Builders. It
is likely that Judge Wald and Judge Henderson would reach the
same conclusions even in light of Morrison and SWANCC. Nevertheless, Morrison and SWANCC raise additional doubts about
whether Judge Wald and Judge Henderson's opinions are consistent

235

23S
237
238

239

2~

Id. at 1064.65.
Id. at 1065.
Id. See also Linehan. supra note 21. at 424 (advancing same argument).
Home Builders. 130 F.3d at 1063. 1067 (Sentelle. J .• dissenting).
Id.
Id.
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with the Supreme Court's narrow reading of the Commerce Power
and protectiveness toward traditional state authority.
While many endangered species have significant impacts on
interstate commerce, the rejection in Morrison of the aggregation of
noneconomic activities raises concerns about Judge Wald's argument that it is appropriate to aggregate together the benefit of
preserving all endangered species in determining their present and
future value to the national economy.241 IT a court must examine the
interstate commercial value of the fly alone, it is more difficult to
demonstrate a significant effect on interstate commerce. For
example, in SWANCC, the Court of Appeals found that protection
of migratory birds had a substantial impact on commerce because
"millions of people spend over a billion dollars annually on recreational pursuits relating to migratory birds.,,242 However, the
Supreme Court concluded that arguments about the value of
preserving isolated wetlands to protect migratory birds raised
"significant constitutional questions" and that "we would have to
evaluate the precise object or activity that, in the aggregate,
substantially affects interstate commerce."243 While its reasoning
is based on statutory and not constitutional grounds, the Court's
concern with the "precise object or activity that, in the aggregate,
substantially affects interstate commerce" might demand more
precision and detailed justification than Judge Wald's argument.
For example,Judge Wald never presented evidence of interstate
trafficking in the fly or showed that it is likely to have medical
value. 244 On the other hand, as discussed in Part VI, Congress had
a rational basis for its findings in the ESA'slegislative history that
preserving biodiversity would result in future economic and medical
benefits. 245

241 Compare United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615 (2000) (rejecting aggregation
of noneconomic impacts in determining whether activity has substantial impact on economy),
with Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1046, 1053-54 (approving aggregation of impacts from loss
of large numbers of or all endangered species).
ro Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps ofEng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 173 (2001).
243 ld.
2« See Scalero, supra note 6, at 337.
245 See infra notes 394-400, 415-17 and accompanying text (discussing Congress's
findings).
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In Lopez, the Court suggested it would have been more willing to
uphold the GFSZA if the statute contained a "jurisdictional element
which would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry," that the activity
at issue substantially affects interstate commerce. 246 While the ESA
includes congressional findings about the long-term value of
protecting endangered species, it does not clearly define when the
protection of endangered species affects interstate commerce. 247
When it enacted the ESA, Congress did not include an explicit
jurisdictional element limiting its applicability to specific commercial activities. 248 Yet Lopez did not hold that a statute must contain
a jurisdictional element defining the statute's relationship to
interstate commerce. 249 The absence of a jurisdictional element
leaves for the courts to decide whether the activity in question
substantially affects interstate commerce.
Judge Henderson argued that the Commerce Clause applies to
regulation of the fly because the species would have been substantially affected by the hospital construction, which was clearly a
commercial activity.250 By contrast, Judge Sentelle argued in
dissent that any relationship between the hospital's construction
and its impact in destroying the fly's habitat was too attenuated to
support federal regulation under the "substantial effects" test
because there would be no "stopping point" in defining the Commerce Power if Congress could regulate any noncommercial activity
that had some impact on or was affected in some way by articles in
interstate commerce.251 A key disagreement between Judge
Henderson and Judge Sentelle in applying the Commerce Clause to
the facts of the case was whether the focus should be on the
economic nature of the hospital construction or on the fly's lack of

United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995).
See White, supra note 6, at 242 (distinguishing ESA from other federal statute which
limited its scope to specific commercial activities).
248 See ide (distinguishing ESAfrom Civil Rights legislation which also lacks jurisdictional
element but applies to readily apparent cases).
2<9 [d. at 243, 253-54 (suggesting Congress might evade Commerce Clause problems by
adding jurisdictional limit).
250 Nat'l ABs'n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1059 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(Henderson, J., concurring).
2,0;1 [d. at 1063, 1067 (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
246

2<7
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commercial value.252 Depending upon whether one views the
extinction of the fly as caused by commercial activities or as a
noncommercial issue because the fly itself is not valuable, one
reaches different answers about whether protection of the fly
substantially affects interstate commerce.253 In this regard, consider
that the Supreme Court in Morrison rejected congressional findings
that gender-based violence had impacts on interstate commerce
because the Court viewed gender-based violence as a noneconomic
activity that had only attenuated impacts on interstate commerce. 254
In Sweet Home, which was decided after Lopez, the Supreme
Court approved a regulation that prohibited private landowners
from destroying the critical habitat of endangered species. 255 While
Sweet Home never directly addressed the issue of whether Congress
had authority under the Commerce Clause to enact the ESA, there
is a strong argument that a regulation that controls development
activities on private lands that contain critical habitat has a direct
impact on interstate commerce. In Sweet Home, the respondents
challenging the prohibition were small landowners, logging
companies, and families dependent on the forest products industries
in the Southeast and Pacific Northwest. 256 In the concluding
paragraph of his majority opinion in Sweet Home, Justice Stevens
asserted that: "the Act encompasses a vast range of economic and
social enterprises and endeavors.,,257 The respondents were
undoubtedly engaged in commerce. In the aggregate, all the persons
affected by the regulation likely had a substantial effect on interstate commerce. While Sweet Home never addressed congressional
authority under the Commerce Power, the Court's approval of
federal regulation of private lands containing the critical habitat of
endangered species at least suggests that the Court .may be less
hostile to federal regulation in this area than it was in Lopez,

See supra notes 232·39 and accompanying text (discussing Judge Sentelle's dissent).
See Nagle, supra note B, at 17B-79, 1B9-91, 20B-14 (discussing whether focus should be
fly or hospital construction).
254 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 59B, 615-16 (2000).
255 Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 696-70B
(1995).
256 [d. at 692.
257 [d. at 70B.
252
253
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Morrison, or SWANCC. 258 On the other hand, the Court could limit
the regulation approved in Sweet Home to species that are directly
involved in interstate commerce.
Judge Wald and Judge Henderson each offered interesting
arguments for concluding that regulation of intrastate endangered
species is constitutional under the Commerce Clause. Part VI will
analyze Judge Wald's argument that courts should defer to congressional findings about the value of preserving biodiversity in more
depth. 259 Judge Henderson's argument that a court should focus on
whether the commercial development that harms an endangered
species substantially affects interstate commerce is valuable, and,
arguably, is implicitly consistent with Sweet Home's approval of
regulation of private landowners. 26o However, her argument is
incomplete without exarn;n;ngwhether the regulation of commercial
activities that affect intrastate endangered species interferes with
traditional state authority over local land use.
B. GIBBS

In 2000, immediately after the Supreme Court decided Morrison,
the Fourth Circuit, in a two-to-one decision by Chief Judge
Wilkinson, rejected a Commerce Clause challenge to the ESA in
Gibbs v. Babbitt. 261 The Gibbs plaintiffs were private landowners
and municipalities in eastern North Carolina who challenged a FWS
regulation that prohibited the taking of endangered red wolves on
private land. 262 The Court estimated that there were approximately
75 red wolves in eastern North Carolina, slightly more than half on
private land. 263
1. The Majority: Taking Red Wolves Substantially Affects
Interstate Commerce. While acknowledging that the taking of an

See supra notes 88-191 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 200-20 and accompanying text (discussing Judge Wald's argument).
2SO See supra notes 222-39 and accompanying text (discussing Judge Henderson's
argument).
261 214 F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied sub nom., Gibbs v. Norton, 531 U.S. 1145
(2001). See generally Dave Owen, Gibbs v. Babbitt, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 377 (2001) (providing
in-depth review and analysis of case).
262 Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 489.
2S3 [d. at 488.
258
259
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individual wolf may be relatively insignificant, the majority
concluded that the taking of red wolves in the aggregate implicates
several commercial activities that substantially affect interstate
commerce as defined in Lopez and Morrison. 264 The Court found
that red wolves are part of a $29.2 billion national wildlife-related
recreational industry that involves tourism and interstate travel. 265
In particular, numerous tourists travel to North qarolina from other
states for ''howling events"--evenings of listening to wolf howls
accompanied by educational programs. 266 Additionally, the protection of red wolf takings stimulated scientific research that had clear
economic value. 267 Moreover, preservation of red wolves could
eventually allow a revival of the trade in their fur pelts once
populations recovered to a sufficient extent. 268 The Fourth Circuit's
holding in Gibbs was sufficient to save ESA regulation of the red
wold because of the species' peculiar economic value. However,
many other endangered species have no apparent economic yalue
and thus benefit little from the reasoning in Gibbs. 269 Accordingly,
this portion of the Gibbs decision is limited to the specific facts
involving the wolf.270
The Gibbs court also found that the taking of wolves on private.
property was directly motivated by the economic interests offarmers
and ranchers, and that this connection clearly qualified as economic
under the Commerce Clause. 271 This would be so even if some might
believe that the preservation of wolves is economically harmful
rather than beneficial: 272
264 ld. at 492·93. See Owen, supra note 261, at 382·83 (noting that "even after Lopez,
protecting endangered species was within Congress's power under the Commerce Clause").
But see Vermeule, supra note 97, at 11336 (questioning whether killing single red wolf is
commercial or economic activity).
26S Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 493.
266 ld.
267 ld. at 493.94.
268 ld. at 495.
269 See Brignac, supra note 10, at 883 (describing wolf as "special case" of endangered
species due to its marketable pelts and tourist-friendly behavior).
270 See Owen, supra note 261, at 391,398 (arguing Gibbs may have limited precedential
effect because red wolf has more obvious connection to interstate commerce than many other
endangered species).
271 Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 495.
~2 ld. But see Vermeule, supra note 97, at 11336 (questioning whether farmer killing red
wolf to protect livestock or homestead is sufficiently commercial or economic activity under
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By restricting the taking of red wolves, § 17.84(c) is
said to impede economic development and commercial
activities such as ranching and farming. This effect
on commerce, however, still qualifies as a legitimate
subject for regulation. The regulation here targets
takings that are economically motivated, in that
farmers take wolves to protect valuable livestock and
crops.273
Thus, the Commerce Power encompasses a regulation preserving
the red wolves not only because the red wolf itself has economic
value but also because the regulation of the wolf has a direct impact
on ranching and farming activities that are clearly a part of
interstate commerce. 274
Furthermore, the Gibbs majority echoed Judge Wald in arguing
that courts should defer to congressional findings about the future
value of endangered species even if those benefits could not be
precisely calculated. 275 The court noted that the Supreme Court has
traditionally deferred to congressional findings that regulation may
produce economic or other benefits in the future as long as there is
a rational basis for such legislative findings. 276 Accordingly,
Congress may protect an endangered species because it might have
a significant economic effect in the future even if it has no present
value or effect. 277
In response to the dissent's argument that the taking of a few red
wolves did not have a substantial impact on commerce, the majority
concluded that it was appropriate to consider the impact of the
entire regulatory scheme on interstate commerce because the
regulation was part ora comprehensive statute seeking to preserve
the species as a whole.278 Because the regulation of red wolves is
primarily an economic issue,279 the court concluded it was proper,
Lopez).
273
274
275
276

277
278
279

Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 495.
Id.
Id. at 496.
Id. at 496.97.
Id. at 496.
Id. at 497.98.
Id. at 493. The Court observed:
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unlike the aggregation of noneconomic activities rejected in Lopez
or Morrison, for Congress to aggregate the total impact of taking all
wolves in determining that such takings could substantially affect
interstate commerce for Commerce Clause purposes:
Because the taking of red wolves can be seen as
economic activity in the sense considered by Lopez
and Morrison, the individual takings may be aggregated for the purpose of Commerce Clause analysis.
While the taking of one red wolf on private land may
not be "substantial," the takings of red wolves in the
aggregate have a sufficient impact on interstate
commerce to uphold this regulation. This is especially so where, as here; the regulation is but one part
of the broader scheme of endangered species legislation. 280
Furthermore, if Congress has the authority to enact a comprehensive scheme for preserving endangered species,281 courts should
not invalidate individual regulations because a particular population is relatively small. 282 In Hodel v. Indiana,283 the Supreme Court
stated:
A complex regulatory program .
can survive a
Commerce Clause challenge without a showing that
every single facet of the program is independently
and directly related to a valid congressional goal. It
is enough that the challenged provisions are an
While the regulation might also reflect a moral judgment concerning the
importance of rehabilitating endangered species, this does not undermine
the economic basis for the regulation. See Heart ofAtlanta Motel, Inc. v.
United States, • . . ("Congress was not restricted by the fact that the
particular obstruction to interstate commerce with which it was dealing
was also deemed a moral and social wrong.").
Id. at 493 n.2.
2BO Id. at 493 (citations omitted).
281 See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 699
(1995) (endorsing Congress's broad purposes behind ESA).
282 Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 497.98.
283 452 U.S. 314 (1981).
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integral part of the regulatory program and that the
regulatory scheme when considered as a whole
satisfies this test. 284
Even the Lopez Court acknowledged that Congress may regulate
intrastate activities that lack substantial commercial value if they
are an "an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity,
in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the
intrastate activity were regulated."285 Otherwise, the Gibbs court
noted, Congress would lack the power to protect the most endangered species simply because "there are too few animals left to make
a commercial difference.,,286 According to the Gibbs court, such a
narrow interpretation of the Commerce Power based solely on the
number of animals at issue would· "eviscerate the comprehensive
federal scheme for conserving endangered species and turn congressional judgment on its head."287
2. Judge Luttig's Dissenting Opinion. Judge Luttig's dissent
argued that the FWS regulation was unconstitutional under Lopez
and Morrison's interpretation of the Commerce Power because the
taking of a handful of red wolves on private property did not come
close to constituting a significant economic activity under the
Commerce Clause. 288 He criticized the majority decision for failing
to follow the relatively narrow definitions of economic activity and
interstate commerce used in both cases. 289 Judge Luttig implied
that regulations protecting endangered species would more likely be
constitutional if the ESA contained an express interstate jurisdictional requirement limiting its scope to interstate commercial
activities such as trade or transportation in pelts or animals. 290
Judge Luttig suggested that the majority's affinity to approve
environmental regulations had led it to misapply the Supreme

Id. at 329 n.17.
Lopez v. United States, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995); Vermeule, supra note 97, at 11335.
28S Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 498.
287 Id.
288 Id. at 507 (Luttig, J., dissenting); see also Virelli & Leibowitz, supra note 73, at 968-74
(arguing majority decision in Gibbs is inconsistent with Supreme Court's holding in
Morrison).
289 Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 507-08 (Luttig, J., dissenting).
290 Id. at 508.
2M

285
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Court's new definition of what constitutes substantial interstate
commerce: "The affirmative reach and the negative limits of the
Commerce Clause do not wax and wane depending upon the subject
matter of the particular legislation under challenge.,,291
3. Is Gibbs Consistent with SWANCC? On first impression, the
Supreme Court's decision in SWANCC casts considerable doubt over
Gibbs. SWANCC suggested in dicta that it is not clear whether the
filling of isolated intrastate wetlands, an activity that affects large
numbers of migratory birds, is within the Commerce Power. 292 It is
likely that the commercial value of the migratory birds is greater
than the few dozen red wolves resident on private property in Gibbs.
However, despite the economic differences, an argument that the
regulation ofred wolves affects interstate commerce is stronger than
an argument that isolated intrastate wetlands are within the
jurisdiction of the Commerce Clause. The ESA regulates animals
that are frequently directly involved in interstate commerce through
transportation, tourism, trade in pelts, and harms or benefits to
agriculture. 293 By contrast, isolated intrastate wetlands by themselves do not necessarily affect interstate commerce. 294 Their
preservation may indirectly affect migratory birds; however, this
has not been conclusively established. In fact, there are some
questions about to what extent the destruction ofisolated, intrastate
wetlands would harm migratory birds because not all intrastate
wetlands would be destroyed, and wetlands in or adjacent to
navigable waters would retain protection. 295 It is the birds, not the
wetlands themselves, that are most directly connec,ted to interstate
commerce.

291 Id. at 510.
m Solid Waste Agency v. United States Atmy Corps. of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 172·74
(2001).
293 See supra notes 264-74 (discussing transportation, tourism, trade in pelts and effects
on agriculture resulting from protection of Red Wolves).
:m See Michael J. Gerhardt, Federal Environmental Regulation in a Post·Lopez World:
Some Questions and Answers, 30 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10980, 10988 (News &
Analysis) (Nov. 2000) ("The isolated wetland in SWANCC is at least a few steps removed from
interstate commerce.").
295 See Anna Johnson Cramer, Note, The Right Results for All the Wrong Reasons: An
Historical and Functional Analysis of the Commerce Clause, 53 VAND. L. REv. 271, 305 (2000)
(illustrating tenuous link between wetland regulation and commercial effects of migratory
birds); Linehan, supra note 21, at 418·19 (same).
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One may disagree with the SWANCC majority that the connection between the wetlands and birds is too remote, but the wetlands
are only indirectly implicated in commerce, unlike many endangered
species that directly affect interstate commerce. Accordingly,
SWANCC s analysis does not necessarily portend that the Supreme
Court will conclude the ESA does not substantially affect interstate
commerce. Nonetheless, even ifthe Gibbs Court correctly concluded
that the red wolves in eastern North Carolina substantially affect
interstate commerce, will courts apply the same analysis to all
endangered species, including those that currently have little or no
apparent value?

v.

THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAs A SPECIAL ROLE IN
CONSERVING WILDLIFE

The Gibbs majority determined that regulation of endangered
species is consistent with the federal government's historic role in
conserving natural resources: "Invalidating this provision would
call into question the historic power of the federal government to
preserve scarce resources in one locality for the future benefit of all
Americans."296 Accordingly, the Gibbs majority concluded that
federal regulation of endangered species does not intrude on
traditional state authority, unlike the statutes invalidated in Lopez
and Morrison. 297 This Part examines whether the argument in
Gibbs, that regulation of endangered species is primarily a federal
activity, is still valid in light of SWANCCs statement that land use
regulation is a traditionally local concern. 298
A. TRADITIONAL STATE ACTIVITIES: WHERE IS THE LINE?

In Lopez, the Court emphasized that it would carefully review
congressional authority under the Commerce Clause whenever
federal legislation attempted to regulate areas traditionally

29G
297
298

Gibbs, 214 F.3d 483 at 492.
Id.
Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 174.
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controlled by state or local governments. 299 The Court suggested
that areas traditionally within the state's regulatory control
included matters "such as criminal law enforcement or education
where States ~storically have been sovereign."soo Similarly, in his
concurring opinion in Lopez, Justice Kennedy argued that courts
should be hesitant in allowing Congress to use the Commerce Power
as the basis for federal regulation in an "area of traditional state
concern" that "States lay claim by right of history and expertise."SOl
He maintained, with such an expansive definition of the Commerce
Power, "the boundaries between the spheres of federal and state
authority would blur and political responsibility would become
illusory."S02
Both Morrison and SWANCC were concerned that an expansive
interpretation of congressional authority under the Commerce
Clause could erode federalism by sanctioning legislation that
excessively intruded on traditional areas of state authority. In
Morrison, the Court stated that it was inappropriate for courts to
aggregate noneconomic activities traditionally regulated by states
for purposes of deciding whether they substantially affect interstate
commerce because such an approach would "completely obliterate
the Constitution's distinction between national and local
authority."s03 The SWANCC Court rejected the Corps interpretation
of the Clean Water Act to include regulation of intrastate isolated
wetlands because an interpretation that extended beyond traditional federal jurisdiction over navigable waters would "alter[] the
federal-state framework by permitting federal encroachment upon
a traditional state power."S04
There is a strong argument that the Lopez, Morrison and
SWANCC decisions underestimated the difficulties in defining the

299 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 n.3 (1995); accord United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,619·20 (2000) ("The Constitutionreqmres a distinction between what
is truly national and what is truly local.,,).
j
300 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564-67.
301 Id. at 580, 583 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
302 Id. at 577.
303 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615.
3G( Solid Waste Agency v. United States Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 173 (2001)
("[U]nless Congress conveys its purpose clearly, it will not be deemed to have significantly
changed the federal·state balance") (quoting United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971».
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limits of traditional state authority.305 In his dissenting opinion in
Morrison, Justice Souter asserted that the majority's efforts to
preserve a sphere of state interests separate from the national
government was doomed to fail just as the similar effort to protect
"traditional government function" from federal regulation in
National League of Cities v. Usery806 had been subsequently
overruled as unworkable in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority 307 because the line between state and federal
authority was too hard to define. a08 Furthermore, the contours of
federalism, the balance of state and federal powers, have clearly
changed since 1789. 809 If change is the norm in federalism, what is
a traditional state activity?
The Supreme Court should return to the more deferential
standard of rational basis review that it used before Lopez in
determining whether congressional legislation impermissibly
interferes with areas of traditional state regulation. In his Morrison
dissent, Justice Souter correctly argued that "politics, not judicial
review, should mediate between state and national interests."310
Nevertheless, regardless of the difficulties in defining traditional
state authority, regulation of endangered species is not a traditional
state function even under the inappropriately stringent approach
used in Lopez, Morrison and SWANCC.

306 See Dral & Phillips, supra note 79, at 10421·22 (assailing such standards as "too
imprecise to provide any sort of basis for a credible and predictable limitation on congressio·
nal power."); Johnson, supra note 6, at 53·54 (predicting that such standards "will likely
result in inconsistent and irreconcilable decisions.").
30S 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
307 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
308 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 645·46 (Souter, J. dissenting) (arguing effort to define traditional
government function for purposes of Tenth Amendment had failed and similar efforts to
ciefine traditional state functions for purposes of commerce power are likewise likely to fail);
see also Dral & Phillips, supra note 79, at 10421·22 (reiterating Justice Souter's argument);
Johnson, supra note 6, at 53·54 (same); Virelli & Leibowitz, supra note 73, at 943·45 (same).
S09 Beginning in 1937, the Supreme Court substantially expanded the breadth of the
Commerce Clause and, thereby expanded federal authority at the expense of states. See
supra notes 72·87 and accompanying text.
310 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 647; Dral & Phillips, supra note 79, at 10421·22.
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B. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAS THE AUTHORITY TO PROTECT
SCARCE NATURAt RESOURCES

While SWANCC suggested that land use regulation is a traditionally local concern,311 in fact, there is concurrent or overlapping
federal and state regulation over private land and wildlife management in various contexts. 312 Although states and local governments
possess broad regulatory and zoning authority over land within
their jurisdictions,313 numerous cases have held that Congress can
regulate even private land use for environmental and wildlife
conservation. 314 Since 1900, Congress has enacted a number of
statutes preserving endangered wildlife regulation,315 which
strongly suggests that the conservation of scarce natural resources
has not been an exclusive or primary state function for quite some
time. Instead, whenever states have failed to address important
conservation issues, the courts have recognized that the federal
government has a legitimate role in addressing gaps in conservation
and preservation efforts. 316 For example, in 1900, Congress enacted
the Lacey Act, which established penalties for the taking of wildlife
in violation of state laws. 317 The Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918
311 See Solid Waste Agency v. United States Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 174 (2001)
("[R]egulation of land use [is] a function traditionally performed by local governments")
(quoting Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 44 (1994».
312 Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 499-501 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied sub nom., Gibbs
.
v. Norton, 531 U.S. 1145 (2001).
313 See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (granting local
governments ability to enact zoning ordinances under police power); Johnson, supra note 6,
at 67 (stating "many courts might consider (local land use) to be an area of ' traditional state
concern.''').
31C See, e.g., Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 500 (providing overview of cases allowing Congress to
regulate private land for environmental conservation).
315 Id. at 500-01 (listing legislation since 1900).
316 See id. ("States may decide to forego or limit conservation efforts in order to lower ...
costs ••. Congress may take cognizance of this dynamic ... in order to prevent interstate
competition whose overall effect would damage the quality of the national environment); cf.
Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rei. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 953 (1982) (holding water to be "article
of commerce").
317 Act of May 25, 1900, ch. 553, 31 Stat. 187 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 701,
3371-78 (1994»; Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 500 (explaining significance of Migratory Bird Treaty Act
ofl918); Philip Weinberg,Does That Line in theSandlnclude Wetlands? CongressionalPower
and Environmental Protection, 30 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) (News & Analysis) 10894,
10897 (Sept. 2000). The Lacey Act now applies to all wild animals, including those bred in
captivity, and to plants protected by treaty or state law. 16 U.S.C. § 3373 (1994) (establishing
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went a step further in setting a national regulatory agenda for
conservation by forbidding the takings of a wide range of bird
species and explicitly preempting inconsistent state laws. 318
Additionally, several federal statutes regulate the taking, management or export of wildlife on non-federal property.319
In 1896, the Supreme Court declared that wildlife was the
property of the state in Geer v. Connecticut. 32o By the early twentieth century, however, the Court had already began the process of
carving out significant exceptions to that general rule. 321 In
Missouri v. Holland,322 the Court upheld the Migratory Bird Treaty
Act as a necessary and proper means of executing Congress' Treaty
Power. 323 The Court stated that the conservation of endangered
wildlife was a "national interest of very nearly the first
magnitude."324 In 1979 the Court overruled Geer, holding that
states do not own the wildlife within their borders and that state
laws regulating wildlife are limited by Congress' authority under the
Commerce Clause. 325 The Court acknowledged that states have a
legitimate interest in wildlife regulation, but suggested that states
must share that authority with the federal government. 326
The Supreme Court has also sustained federal conservation
statutes that apply to non-federal and private land. In 1977, the
Supreme Court held that Congress had the authority under the
Commerce Clause to issue federal fishing licenses for use in state
penalties for violating provision); see Coggins & Harris, supra note 27, at 305·07 (discussing
1981 Lacey Act Amendments).
318 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-12 (1994).
319 See, e.g., The Bald Eagle Protection Act of 1940, 16 U.S.C. §§ 668-668d (1994)
(forbidding taking, possession, selling, or exporting of bald eagles or any of their parts);
Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1421h (1994 & Supp_ III 1997)
(regulating taking and export of marine mammals); Magnuson Fishery Conservation and
ManagementActof1976, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801·83 (1994 & Supp.1II 1997) (establishing national
standards for fishery conservation).
320 161 U.S. 519 (1896) (upholding Connecticut statute prohibiting interstate transportation of game birds that had been killed within state); White, supra note 6, at 248·49.
321 See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 329 (1979) ("The erosion of Geer began only
15 years after it was decided."); Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 499 (noting "w[as] modified early in the
twentieth century.").
322 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
323 [d. at 435.
32. [d. at 435.
32S Hughes, 441 U.S. at 326, 335.
326 [d. at 335-36; Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 499; White, supra note 6, at 249.
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waters, and, thus, preempted conflicting state laws. 327 Two years
later, in Andrus v. Allard, the Court stated that the "assumption
that the national commerce power does not reach migratory wildlife
is clearly flawed.,,328 In its 1999 decision, in Minnesota v. Mille Lacs
Band of Chippewa Indians ("Mille Lacs"),329 the Court reiterated
that "[a]1though States have important interests in regulating
wildlife and natural resources within their borders, this authority
is shared with the Federal Government when the Federal Government exercises one of its enumerated constitutional powers.,,330 In
Mille Lacs, the Court upheld Chippewa Indian rights under an 1837
treaty that allowed the Chippewa to hunt, fish, and gather independent of territorial, and later state, regulation. 331 The Court
concluded that the Native American treaty rights were "reconcilable
with state sovereignty over natural resources.,,332
It is possible to argue that the federal role in conservation has
focused primarily in areas with significant interstate commercial
value and that the ESA goes beyond that role. For instance,
numerous species such as the bald eagle and other migratory birds
have significant commercial value. 333 Furthermore, hunting and
fishing licenses can have significant commercial value. Thus, an
argument can. be made that federal regulation of scarce resources
has traditionally involved only commerchil activities. By contrast,
not all endangered or threatened species have commercial value.
Accordingly, it is possible to argue that federal regulation of
migratory birds, fishing and hunting does not provide a precedent
for the ESA.
However, in light of Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in
Lopez, a better question to ask is whether the ESA interferes with

Douglas v. Seacoast Prods., Inc., 431 U.S. 265, 281-82 (1977).
444 U.S. 51, 63 n.19 (1979).
329 526 U.S. 172 (1999).
330 Id. at 204.
331 Id. at 175-76,208.
332 Id. at 205.
333 See Solid Waste Agency v. United States Corps ofEng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 192-95 (2001)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing migratory birds have significant value in aggregate and
affect tourism); United States v. Bramble, 103 F.3d 1475, 1482 (9th eir. 1996) (destruction
of bald eagle would have substantial impact on commerce).
321

328
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a traditional area of state regulation. 334 States have not traditionally regulated scarce or endangered species. 3s5 Even if Congress's
enactment of the ESA in 1973 expanded the scope of federal
regulation of scarce resources beyond traditional commercial
categories, the ESA generally did not displace existing state law
concerning endangered species, as little state regulation existed. 336
Because the ESA does not infringe on an area of traditional state
land use regulation, federal courts should apply a deferential
approach in analyzing whether the ESA affects interstate commerce
rather than the constricting approach applied in Lopez, Morrison,
and even SWANCC.
While tightening the scope of the Commerce Clause, the Lopez
decision did not call into question cases holding that the federal
government has an independent role in conservation of endangered
wildlife or scarce natural resources. Shortly after Lopez, in Sweet
Home, the Court upheld a FWS regulation defining "harm" in the
Endangered Species Act to include "significant habitat modification"
on both private and public land, although the Court never mentioned Lopez or the Commerce Clause. 337 Subsequently, several
lower court decisions have approved federal regulation of nonfederal land despite Lopez. For example, the Ninth Circuit has
concluded that the Bald Eagle Protection Act is within the scope of
the Commerce Clause because Congress could rationally conclude
that "extinction of the eagle would have a substantial effect on
interstate commerce."338 Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit has held
that the private, on-site, intrastate disposal of hazardous waste was
within Congress's authority to regulate because such disposal
"significantly impacts interstate commerce."339
See supra notes 88·115 and accompanying text (discussing Lopez).
See White, supra note 6, at 250·52 (arguing federal government has greater expertise
than states in environmental protection and wildlife conservation).
336 In 1973, Congress enacted the current version of the Endangered Species Act because
protection of endangered species on federal land alone had failed to stop species extinction,
and thus state regulation was clearly ineffective. See supra notes 28·29. See also White,
supra note 6, at 251·52 (arguing state regulation of endangered species is inadequate).
337 Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 696·708
(1995).
338 Bramble, 103 F.3d at 1482.
339 United States v. Olin, 107 F.3d 1506, 1509·11 (11th Cir. 1997); Weinberg, supra note
317, at 10897.
334
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The preservation of endangered species is an especially appropriate role for federal regulation. According to Gibbs, the Supreme
Court has recognized that federal regulation of scarce natural
resources is often necessary to prevent a "race to the bottom" among
states engaged in over-exploitation of their resources to compete
with other states. 340 In Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and
Reclamation Ass'n,341 the Court approved federal regulation of
intrastate mining activities under the Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act of 1977 to prevent ruinous competition among
states that would likely lead to inadequate environmental standards. 342 In approving federal regulation of intrastate mining
operations, the Court stated, "The prevention of this sort of
destructive interstate competition is a traditional role for congressional action under the Commerce Clause."343 In Home Builders, 344
Judge Wald argued:
The parallels between Hodel v. Virginia and the case
at hand are obvious. The ESA and the Surface
Mining Act both regulate activities-destruction of
endangered species and destruction of the natural
landscape-that are carried out entirely within a
State and which are not themselves commercial in
character. The activities, however, may be regulated
because they have destructive effects, on environmental quality in one case and on the availability of a
variety of species in the other, that are likely to affect
more than one State. In each case, moreover, interstate competition provides incentives to states to
adopt lower standards to gain an advantage vis-a.-vis
other states: In Hodel v. Virginia the states were
motivated to adopt lower environmental standards to

340 Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 501·02 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied sub nom., Gibbs v.
Norton, 531 U.S. 1145 (2001).
lUI 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
au See id. at 281·82 (observing congressional concern such competition among states
would prevent "adequate standards on coal mining operations within their borders.").
343 Id. at 282.
lU4 130 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
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improve the competitiveness of their coal production
facilities, and in this case, the states are motivated to
adopt lower standards of endangered species protection in order to attract development. 345
There has been a vigorous academic debate about whether
competition among states results in a lowering of environmental
standards-a "race-to-the-bottom."346 More important for the
purposes of this Article is whether Congress has authority under the
Commerce Clause to regulate the local impacts of interstate
competition. First, there is evidence that the Framers intended the
Commerce Clause to allow congressional regulation of commercial
issues that affected the nation as a whole and could not be effectively addressed at the state level. 347 Accordingly, there is a good
argument based on the Framers' intent that the Commerce Clause
authorizes Congress to prevent destructive interstate competition. 348
Second, the Supreme Court clearly approved congressional
regulation of destructive interstate competition in Hodel. 349 Because
courts still apply a rational basis test in evaluating the constitutionality of congressional regulation under the Commerce Clause,350 it
is likely that the Supreme Court would give considerable deference

34.\ Id. at 1055 (citations and footnote omitted). In dissent, Judge Sentelle argued that
regulation protecting the habitat was not commercial in character and hence was unlike the
regulation of commercial intrastate mining in Hodel. Id. at 1066 (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
However, he seems to have missed Judge Wald's point that the environmental values
protected from destructive economic competition in Hodel were at least partially noncommer·
cial and were similar to the environmental protection of endangered species.
:us Compare Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard·Setting: Is There a "Race"
and Is It "To the Bottom"?, 48 HAsTINGS L.J. 271, 352 (1997) (arguing empirical evidence
suggests interstate competition results in "race-to-the-bottom" that lowers environmental
standards), with Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the
''Race-to-the-Bottom'' Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1210, 1211 (1992) (challenging conventional wisdom that interstate competition lowers
environmental standards and arguing that any losses are more than made up by compensating gains from increased economic activity). See also Richard L. Revesz, The Race to the
Bottom and Environmental Regulation: A Response to Critics, 82 MINN. L. REv. 535, 545
(1997) (responding to critics of his argument disputing "race to the bottom rationale").
347 See Engel, supra note 346, at 281-82 (discussing justification for federal regulations).

348
349

350

Id.
Id. at 282.
See infra notes 415-22, 429-38 and accompanying text (discussing viability of rational

basis test).
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to a congressional finding that federal regulation is necessary to
prevent a race to the bottom in a particular area. 351 However,
because C~>ngress never made explicit findings that there was a race
to the bottom among states that was leading to species extinction, 352
the Court might refuse to follow Judge Wald's approach in applying
the Hodel analysis to the ESA.
On the other hand, the prevention of such a race to the bottom is
arguably implicit in the ESA's goal of setting uniform standards
among states. In Gibbs, the Fourth Circuit recognized that "[a]
desire for uniform standards also spurred enactment of the ESA.,,353
According to the House Report on the 1973 Amendments to the ESA,
"protection of endangered species is not a matter that can be
handled in the absence of coherent national and international
policies: the results of a series of unconnected and disorganized
policies and programs by various states might well be confusion
compounded.,,354 The Gibbs Court concluded that the uniform
standards of the ESA promote interstate commerce by preventing
companies from having to comply with conflicting state standards. 355
Furthermore, while commentators disagree about whether
economic competition among states results in an environmental race
to the bottom, there is little question that many states lack adequate programs for biodiversity and habitat protection. 356 It is likely
that federal regulation will result in greater conservation of
endangered species, and ultimately promote greater commerce in
such animals when species achieve recovery. Thus, there are strong
policy reasons for courts to read the commerce power broadly to

Funk. supra note 14. at 10767.
See generally supra notes 27-53 (discussing legislative history of Endangered Species
Act). The ESA's legislative history does refer to the need for Uniform Standards:
"[p]rotection of endangered species is not a matter that can be handled in absence of coherent
national and interstational policies; the results of a series of unconnected and disorganized
polices and programs by various states might well be confusion compounded." See H.R. Rep.
93-415. at 5 (1973); Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 501-02 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied sub
nom., Gibbs v. Norton, 531 U.S. 1145 (2001).
353 Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 502.
354 H.R. REP. No. 93-412, at 7 (1973).
355 Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 502.
356 See White, supra note 6, at 250-52 (arguing federal government has greater expertise
than states in environmental protection and wildlife conservation).
351
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include federal regulation of the commerce in and protection of
endangered species.
C. THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT DOES NOT BLUR THE LINE BETWEEN
FEDERAL AND STATE AUTHORITY

In his concurring opinion in Lopez, Justice Kennedy argued that
courts should be cautious in using the Commerce Clause to authorize federal legislation that regulates an "area of traditional state
concern" to which "States lay claim by right of history and expertise."357 According to Justice Kennedy, courts should carefully
review federal regulatory statutes that intrude on traditional state
concerns because such legislation tends to undermine the delicate
balance between state and federal authority. 358 If the Supreme
Court approves an overly broad reading of the Commerce Clause,
"the boundaries between the spheres of federal and state authority
would blur and political responsibility would become illusory.,,359
The Endangered Species Act does not blur the line between state
and federal regulation of wildlife. 360 The ESA extends federal
regulation only to "a single limited area"361-threatened and
endangered species, and only after reviewing "those efforts, if any,
being made by any State ... to protect such species."862 All other
species are left to state control. 363 Thus, the ESA does not give the
federal government an unlimited police power inconsistent with the
Constitution's explicit and implicit concerns about federalism. 364 If
the ESA is successful, eventually most, if not all, endangered species
will achieve recovery and return to complete state control. 865

357

358

United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 580·83 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 577.

Id.
See Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 502·03 (discussing principles of cooperative federalism in ESA).
361 Id. at 503.
362 Id.
363 Id.
3IU Id.
38S See id. (quoting, 16 U.S.C. § 1532(3) (1994), which defines "conservation" as "the use
of all methods and procedures which are necessary to bring any endangered species or
threatened species to the point at which the measures provided pursuant to this chapter are
no longer necessary").
359

360
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The ESA recognizes the need for cooperative federalism by
involving the states in the protection of endangered species. For
instance, the Secretary may list a species as endangered or threatened only after reviewing "those efforts, if any, being made by any
State ... toprotectsuchspecies."366 Furthermore, the ESAprovides
that the Secretary of Interior may enter into cooperative programs
with states that have adequate programs for conserving threatened
and endangered species and provide financial assistance for such
programs. 367 Finally, once the species has recovered and is
"delisted," states regain primary authority in regulating the
species. 368
Using a narrow interpretation of the Commerce Clause to strike
down the ESA would intrude on the traditional federal role in the
conservation of endangered species and unduly expand state
authority beyond its traditional limits. In Gibbs, the Fourth Circuit
argued:
It is as threatening to federalism for courts to erode
the historic national role over scarce resource conservation as it is for Congress to usurp traditional state
prerogatives in such areas as education and domestic
relations. Courts seeking to enforce the structural
constraints of federalism must respect the balance on
both sides. 369
Despite the state's traditional role in. land use regulation, the
federal government has taken the primary role in conserving
endangered species. Federalist principles suggest that the courts
should read the Commerce Power broadly to support the vital
federal role in preserving threatened species.

366
367
368
368

See id. (discussing 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(I){A) (1994».
16 U.S.C. §§ 1535(c),{d) (1994).
Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 503.
Id. at 505.
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GmBSPROBABLYSUR~SSWANCC

In Lopez and Morrison, a majority of the Supreme Court put
limitations on the use of the Commerce Clause to justify broad
federal intrusion into traditional state areas such as education and
criminal law. In SWANCC, the Court emphasized "States' traditional and primary power over land and water use.'>370 While
SWANCC highlighted the role of states in controlling land use
decisions, the Court did not suggest that the federal government has
no role in environmental regulation, an area that does not raise the
same federalism concerns as gun control and family law. Thus,
Judge Wilkinson's argument in Gibbs that the conservation of
endangered species is a special area where the federal government
has at least concurrent and perhaps primary jurisdiction371 is
potentially compatible with SWANCC. In Sweet Home, which
followed Lopez, the Court approved a broad interpretation of federal
authority over the taking of endangered species on private
property.372 Accordingly, even if the Supreme Court is strongly
committed to preserving traditional state authority over land use,
federalism concerns should not impede the federal regulation of
scarce resources, including endangered species, which has been a
primary federal responsibility since the early 20th century.
VI. COURTS SHOULD DEFER TO THE ENDANGERED SPECIES AcT's
GoALS OF PRESERVING OUR GENETIC HERITAGE AND
PRESERVING BIODIVERSITY

A. AGGREGATION OF DIFFERENT ENDANGERED SPECIES: ARE THEY
SIMILAR ENOUGH?

Because the future benefits of any particular endangered or
threatened species are usually uncertain, an important issue is
whether courts may aggregate the economic impact of all endan-

370
371
372

(1995).

Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps ofEng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 174 (2001).
See supra notes 261-87 and accompanying text.
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 696·708
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gered species or must examine the impact of individual species that
currently have little value. Neither Wickard nor Lopez specify the
prerequisites for aggregating similar activities in assessing their
impact on interstate commerce. 373 In Morrison, the Court refused
to aggregate primarily noneconomic activities, such as violent acts
against women, in determining whether the statute at issue had a
substantial impact on the interstate commerce. 374 By contrast, in
Gibbs, Judge Wilkinson persuasively argued that preserving red
wolves has enough of an economic impact even in light of Morrison's
economic aggregation test to justify the aggregation of all red wolves
in calculating the value of a regulation preserving them. 375 However, even if the Gibbs Court was correct that red wolves have
economic value, what about species that have no apparent value?
In Home Builders,376 Judge Wald seemed to accept the government's argument that the limited commercial value of the Delhi
Sands Flower-Loving Fly was irrelevant and that it was appropriate
to consider the aggregate value of all endangered species. 377 She
argued that because the Wickard Court considered the impact of all
wheat on interstate commerce, it was an appropriate analogy for
courts to aggregate all endangered species in evaluating their
impact on commerce. 378 Similarly, because the ESA is a "comprehensive statute" that seeks to maximize both present and future
economic benefits, the Gibbs court suggested that courts should
aggregate the total economic and social benefits of preserving

373 See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw 226 (3d ed. 1996) (suggesting
neither Wickard nor Lopez specify how similar activities must be to be aggregated); Nagle,
supra note 8, at 179·80 (making same argument).
.
374 See Morrison v. United States 529 U.S. 598, 615-17 & n.4 (2000) (arguing only
economic activities should be aggregated in determining whether law has substantial impact
on interstate commerce).
375 Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 438, 493 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied sub nom., Gibbs v.
Norton, 531 U.S. 1145 (2001).
376 130 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
377 See id. at 1046 (describing clsss to be aggregated as "all similarly situated endangered
species"); see also Brieffor the Appellees at 27, Nat'l Ass'n. of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130
F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (No. 96·5354) (asserting "[t]he appropriate analytical framework
aggregates the effects of all conduct within the class of activities regulated by the challenged
statutory provision") [hereinafter U.S. Brief]; Nagle, supra note 8, at 194-95 n.83 (noting
Judge Wald may have been referring to narrow class of "similarly situated" endangered
species).
378 Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1049 n.7.
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endangered and threatened species. 379 The persuasive reasoning of
Gibbs suggests that the ESA's prohibition on the taking of such
species is likely to substantially affect interstate commerce for
Commerce Clause purposes. 380
Under the Constitution's Necessary and Proper Clause, Congress
may enact statutes that are necessary and proper to effectuate the
Commerce Power. 381 Because the ESA creates a comprehensive
regulatory scheme that substantially affects interstate commerce,
Judge Wald suggested that courts should not focus on the intrastate
location or noncommercial value of species that are encompassed
with the necessary and proper workings of the statute. 382 She
quoted Lopez for the principle that "where a general regulatory
scheme bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimis
character of individual instances arising under the statute is of no
consequence."383
Professor Nagle argues that Wickard does not necessarily support
the aggregation of all endangered species. 384 Wickard aggregated
"all wheat grown by farmers for their personal use," but did not
aggregate all crops grown by farmers for their personal use. 385
Additionally, while the amount of wheat consumed by the farmer
directly affected interstate commerce, the destruction of some
endangered animals with no economic value would not impact
commerce unless such harm threatens their extinction. 386 Professor
Nagle questions whether it is appropriate to aggregate all endangered species if many of those species lack any significant connection to interstate commerce. 387 While courts have used the broad
principles inherent in the Necessary and Proper Clause to allow
Congress to regulate commercial activities that may include a few

See Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 497 (identifying ESA as "comprehensive" and "far·reaching").
Id. at 493.
381 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17 (giving Congress powers necessary to execute its
duties).
382 Nagle, supra note 8, at 200.
383 Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1046, 1053 n.14 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549, 558 (1995» (emphasis omitted).
384 Nagle, supra note 8, at 193.95.
ass Id. at 194.
386 Id. at 195.
387 Id. at 197.
379

380
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isolated examples that lack commercial value, Professor Nagle
argues that it is appropriate for courts to ignore species that lack
commercial value if there are only a few de minimis examples of
such noncommercial species-and only if those species are substantially similar enough to be aggregated with species that substantially affect interstate commerce. 388 While it does not directly
address 40w courts should aggregate activities, Lopez was clearly
concerned with overly broad aggregations, especially those that
interfere with areas of traditional state authority. 389
The question of whether it is appropriate to aggregate all
endangered and threatened species depends upon whether they are
similar enough to be considered together. At first glance, it might
seem inappropriate to aggregate species that are markedly different
in biological form such as grizzly bears, flies, and fish. Furthermore, why should courts aggregate commercially valuable species
with those that lack value?
There are three good rationales for aggregating all endangered
species. First, the biodiversity argument postulates that different
species often affect each other and that, as a result, the environment
is better off if there are more species in the ecosystem. 890 Second,
the future benefits argument states that while the future value of
any particular species is often unclear, the future value of preserving as many threatened and endangered species as possible is
considerable. 391 Finally, courts should defer to legislative findings
in the ESA that rely on the biodiversity and future benefits
arguments because, as mentioned below, they do not raise the same
federalism concerns that attracted heightened scrutiny in Lopez and

Morrison. 892

SS8 Id. at201-02 (discussing United States v. Bolton, 68 F.3d"396, 399 (10th Cir. 1995) C'[I]f
a statute regulates an activity which, through repetition, in aggregate has a substantial affect
on interstate commerce •.. 'the de minimis character of individual instances arising under
the statute is of no consequence.'
389 Id. at 197.
390 See infra notes 393-401 and accompanying text.
391 See infra notes 402-28 and accompanying text.
392 See infra notes 429-38 and accompanying text.
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B. THE BIODIVERSITY RATIONALE FOR AGGREGATING ENDANGERED
SPECIES

The value of biodiversity provides a strong argument for aggregating together endangered and threatened species. As Judge Wald
suggested in Home Builders,393 the presence of a large number of
different animal and plant species provides substantial benefits to
interstate commerce. 394 According to Judge Wald, scientific data
supported congressional findings in the ESA's 1973 legislative
history that "takings [of endangered species] would have a substantial effect on interstate commerce by depriving commercial actors of
access to an important natural resource-biodiversity."395 Furthermore, Judge Henderson in her concurring opinion pointed out that
"[g]iven the interconnectedness of species and ecosystems, it is
reasonable to conclude that the extinction of one species affects
others and their ecosystems and that the protection of a purely
intrastate species ... will therefore substantially affect land and
objects that are involved in interstate commerce.,,396 Under the
biodiversity rationale for aggregation, individual species are
important only in that each species potentially affects the preservation oflarge numbers of species. 397 Many species that lack individual commercial value perform important "ecosystem services" such
as the decomposition of organic matter, renewal of soil, mitigation
of floods, purification of air and water, or partial stabilization of
climatic variation. 398 These are substantial ecosystem benefits that
substantially affect interstate commerce. Accordingly, the loss of
even those endangered species that have little present economic
value frequently adversely impacts other species that have commercial value. 399 Because the preservation of as many endangered and

130 F.3d 104l.
[d. at 1052.53.
395 [d. at 1052·54; Scalero, supra note 6, at 338.
396 Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1059 (Henderson, J., concurring).
397 John Charles Kunich, Preserving the Womb of the Unknown Species with Hotspots
Legislation, 2 HAsTING L.J. 1149, 1164·65 (2001) (detailing subtle and overlooked functions
of ordinary species). See also Nagle, supra note 8, at 188·89 (discussing importance of large
number of species).
398 See Kunich, supra note 397, at 1164·65 (discussing concept of ecosystem survival).
399 See id. (discussing numerous benefits both apparent and less visible created by living
393
394
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threatened species as possible significantly affects interstate
commerce by maintaining biodiversity, the aggregation of all
endangered and threatened species is justifiable under the Wickard
rule. 400
.
Professor Nagle posits that the biodiversity arguments for
aggregation suggested by Judge Wald and Judge Henderson go too
far because their reasoning would justify an "Earth Preservation
Act" forbidding harm to any natural objects of the earth.401
However, a limited biodiversity rationale is consistent with
federalist principles. While it would be inappropriate to infringe on
traditional state regulation of animals and land use by regulating
all living things for all time, there is a strong argument for a limited
and concurrent federal regulatory role in preserving the limited
number of threatened and endangered species until they can recover
sufficiently to be returned to state control. Because federal
regulation in the ESA is limited in both scope and time, the statute
does not interfere with traditional state control over land use or
animals.
C. MAY COURTS CONSIDER THE POTENTIAL FUTURE BENEFITS OF
ENDANGERED SPECIES?

Both Judge Wald and Judge Wilkinson argued that it was
appropriate for courts to consider the future economic benefits and
medical potential of all endangered species in evaluating whether
their protection substantially affects interstate commerce. In Home
Builders, Judge Wald concluded that the ESA substantially affected
interstate commerce by conserving genetic resources that may have
future medical value. 402 Similarly the Gibbs court argued that,
under the Commerce Clause, Congress may protect an endangered
species with no present economic value or effect because it might
have a significant economic effect in the future. 403 By contrast,

species).
01 See id. 1164-68 (discussing ecosystem benefits created by having wide variety ofliving
species)•
.01 Nagle, supra note 8, at 198-99.
.a2 National Ass'n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1050-53 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
.a3 Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 498 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied sub nom., Gibbs v.
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Judge Sentelle and Judge Luttig contended that the benefits of the
Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly404 and the Red Wolf05 respectively
were far too speculative to justify regulation under the Commerce
Clause. Both argued that there is no proof that either species will
provide significant future economic or medical benefits. 406
The loss of endangered species threatens significant future
economic harm by reducing biodiversity and eliminating genetic
material that could provide valuable medical and other resources.
Preserving the diversity of plants and animals is important for
providing a reliable source of food for human beings because overreliance on a few crops makes them more vulnerable to disease and
pests. 407 Additionally, plants and animals are sources of chemicals
and raw materials for many commercial products. 408 Approximately
half of all drugs used in medicine are derived from plants or
animals, including several endangered species, with a total value
exceeding $14 billion per year. 409
Despite rapidly developing scientific knowledge, scientists often
do not know which species will prove valuable in the future. The
pharmaceutical industry actively tests plants and animals to
discover new medicines. 410 The biotechnology industry has developed advanced methods of screening called bioprospecting to
Norton, 531 U.S. 1145 (2001).
W4 Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1064-65 (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
roll Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 507 (Luttig, J., dissenting).
~ See Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1064-65 (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (arguing fly at issue
in case has no apparent value); Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 507 (Luttig, J., dissenting) \We are not
even presented with an activity as to which a plausible case of future economic character and
impact can be made."); see also Nagle, supra note 8, at 183·84 (admitting there is no available
evidence of fly's value but scientists do not know everything about fly).
407 See Coggins & Harris, supra note 27, at 253·55 (discussing crop composition of human
diets); Kunich, supra note 397, at 1167 (asserting possibility of insignificant species becoming
significant). For example, American farmers use genes from wild plant species in producing
nearly $1 billion of crops. Nagle, supra note 8, at 185.
408 See Coggins & Harris, supra note 27, at 256·57 (providing examples of plants used in
business and industry).
409 See id. at 255·56 (discussing role of plants in medicine); Kunich, supra note 397, at
1163·64 (stating total value of drugs derived from wild organisms is $14 billion per year);
Nagle, supra note 8, at 185 (noting plants are being studied to find cure for AIDS); White,
supra note 6, at 243·47 (discussing impact of biological diversity). For instance, an extract
from the Pacific yew tree is the source of the chemotherapy drug Paclitaxel, which is used to
treat ovarian and breast carcinomas. Id. at 244·45.
410 See White, supra note 6, at 244·46 (providing examples of successful pharmaceutical
discoveries).
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determine if an organism's genetic material is suitable for creating
new pharmaceuticals.4l1 Nevertheless, less than one-half of one
percent of all flowering plants have been assayed for potential
pharmaceuticals. 412 While scientific knowledge about genetics is
continually advancing, it is impossible to know for certain what
value a species will have in the future. 413 Accordingly, there is a
strong argument that it is safer to preserve as many species as
possible because we can never be sure whether a species could be
useful in the future. 414
Even though many of the future benefits of endangered species
are necessarily speculative, courts should defer to congressional
findings in the ESA's 1973 legislative history about the potential
value of preserving their genetic heritage for future scientific
development. 415 In Gibbs, the majority argued that congressional
findings about the value of endangered species were entitled to
significant deference even if the exact value was not clear.41~ The
. Gibbs court stated:
Congress is entitled to make the judgment that
conservation is potentially valuable, even if that
value cannot be presently ascertained. The Supreme
Court has held that the congressional decision to
maintain abandoned railroad track is reasonable
"even if no future rail use for it is currently foreseeable." The Court reasoned that "[g]iven the long
tradition of congressional regulation of railroad
abandonments, that is a judgment that Congress is

m White, supra note 6, at 244.
See Marvin J. Cetron & Owen Davies, Trends Now Changing the World: Economics
and Society, Values and Concerns, Energy and Environment, 35 THE FUTURIsr 30,43 (Jan.Feb. 2001) (describing species loss as having "powerful negative impact on human well-being"
and noting less than 0.5% of plants have been evaluated for pharmaceutical potential);
Kunich, supra note 397, at 1164 (noting pharmaceuticals come from only few hundred of
available species).
413 Kunich, supra note 397, at 1166.
414 See White, supra note 6, at 246 (arguing as technology advances, different species may
become important).
.
415 ld.
416 Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied sub nom., Gibbs v. Norton,
531 U.S. 1145 (2001).
412
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entitled to make." Similarly, Congress has long been
involved in the regulation of scarce and vital natural
resources. The full payoff of conservation in the form
of tourism, research, and trade may not be foreseeable. Yet it is reasonable for Congress to decide that
conservation of species will one day produce a substantial commercial benefit to this country and that
failure to preserve a species will result in permanent,
though unascertainable, commercialloss. 417
Courts commonly defer to rational congressional concerns about
the future impacts of regulated activities, including those affecting
the Commerce Power. For example, the Supreme Court has
cautioned that courts should give additional deference to administrative agencies addressing the "frontiers" of science such as nuclear
waste technology.418 Similarly, in TVA v. Hill,419 the Supreme Court
suggested that courts should defer to congressional concerns in the
ESA regarding "the unknown uses that endangered species might
have and about the unforeseeable place such creatures may have in
the chain of life on this planet."42o More specifically, in holding that
the Bald Eagle Protection Act was within the scope of the Commerce
Clause, the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Bramble421 relied in
part on the impact that extinction of the eagle would have on future
interstate commerce:
Extinction of the eagle would substantially affect
interstate commerce by foreclosing any possibility of
several types of commercial activity: future commerce in eagles or their parts; future interstate travel
for the purpose of observing or studying eagles; or
future commerce in beneficial products derived either

Id. at 496 (citations omitted).
Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983).
419 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
420 Id. at 178·79; accord Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 496 rCongress is entitled to make the
judgment that conservation is potentially valuable, even if that value cannot be presently
ascertained.").
421 103 F.3d 1475 (9th Cir. 1996).
417
418
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from eagles or from analysis of their genetic
material. 422
Conversely, critics of the future benefits justification for the ESA
contend that there is no proof that some endangered species with no
present economic value will ever have future economic or medical
benefits. 423 Additionally, there would be a stronger case for
considering uncertain future benefits if an activity has some present
value or had value in the past. For example, in Preseault v. ICC, 424
abandoned railroad tracks had some past value and the continued
presence of the rights-of-way made it plausible that the land might
be used that way again. 425 Accordingly, critics of the future benefits
justification would argue that there is not a rational basis for
assuming that endangered species without present economic value
have benefits that are ever likely to affect interstate commerce in
any significant manner.426 Yet even these critics acknowledge that
these species could have unknown benefits yet to be discovered. 427
The question is whether those possible future benefits are enough
to justify federal regulation under the Commerce Clause.
Because it is difficult to predict the future value of any given
species, it is appropriate for courts to defer to Congress' judgment
that preserving all endangered species will yield substantial overall
future economic benefits rather than demanding proof that any
given species is likely to provide medical or other economic value.
The ESA is also likely to benefit future medical research and other
areas of interstate commerce by preserving biodiversity and genetic
material for future generations. 428 Courts should aggregate the
benefits of all endangered species because it is impossible to
estimate all the present, much less the future, effects particular

Id. at 1481.
See Nagle, supra note 8, at 182·83 (arguing many endangered species lack any present
on likely future commercial value).
m 494 U.S. 1 (1990).
425 Id. at 19. See also Nagle, supra note 8, at206·07 (distinguishing evidence of past effect
on interstate commerce from speculative effects).
42S Nagle, supra note 8, at 182·83.
aT See id. at 183·84 (conceding some endangered species could have future commercial
value).
42S See supra notes 393-401 and accompanying text (describing benefits ofbiodiversity).
422
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species will have on interstate commerce. Thus, the statute is
unlike the primarily noneconomic criminal statutes that the Court
refused to aggregate in Lopez and Morrison.
D. APPLYING RATIONAL BASIS REVIEW TO THE AGGREGATION ISSUE

Even after Lopez and Morrison, the Supreme Court purports to
apply a rational basis review in deciding whether a statute based on
the Commerce Clause regulates activities substantially affecting
interstate commerce. 429 In Morrison, the Court stated that there is
a presumption that a statute enacted pursuant to the Commerce
Power is constitutional. 480 In enacting the ESA Amendments in
1973, Congress had a rational basis for believing that the statute
would advance the nation's long-term commercial interests.
Accordingly, courts should defer to congressional findings about the
long-term value of preserving endangered species and their
irreplaceable genetic heritage. The ESA's goal of preserving genetic
material of endangered species for the benefit of future generations
clearly meets a rational basis standard of review even though the
exact benefit of preserving any given species is often not clear. The
total benefits from preserving all endangered species are likely to be
substantial.
Because Congress had a rational basis for believing the protection
of all threatened and endangered species would produce both
present and future social benefits, courts should aggregate all such
species when evaluating their impact and conclude that the ESA
substantially affects interstate commerce, both in the present and
the future. 431 While it is a complex statute addressing both
economic and noneconomic interests, the ESA's comprehensive
regulatory scheme substantially affects today's interstate commerce
by preserving many species that have current substantial economic
value. 432 Even after Lopez and Morrison, if a statute is primarily

{29 See Dral & Phillips, supra note 79, at 10417·18 (discussing unworkable standards set
forth in Lopez and Morrison).
430 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,607 (2000).
431 See, e.g., Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483,493 (4th eir. 2000), cert. denied sub nom.,
Gibbs v. Norton, 531 U.S. 1145 (2001) (aggregating individual takings of red wolves).
432 [d. at 492.93,497.98.
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economic in nature, a court looks at its total impact on interstate
commerce rather than examining individual portions of the
statutory scheme to determine if each part has substantial impacts
on commerce.433
Congress may regulate intrastate activities that do not substan·
tially affect interstate commerce if they are "an integral part of [a]
regulatory program" that addresses a broader problem that
substantially affects interstate commerce.434 Thus, a comprehensive
scheme that is necessary for regulating interstate commerce may
reach some activities that are both intrastate and lack substantial
commercial value. 435 While holding that the GFSZA was not such
a comprehensive regulatory scheme, the Lopez decision confirmed
this principle and allowed the regulation of "an essential part of a
larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory
scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were
regulated."436 By implication, under Lopez, if a comprehensive
regulatory scheme is needed to address a serious national problem
that substantially affects interstate commerce, Congress may, as
part of an integral scheme, regulate intrastate activities that do not
in themselves substantially affect interstate commerce. 437 In
applying this principle of aggregation to the ESA, courts should
defer to the congressional judgment that the ESA's integral
regulatory scheme is necessary to protect important interstate
commercial interests even "if the statute may encompass some
intrastate species that presently lack substantial impacts on
interstate commerce in their own right. 438
VII. CONCLUSION

This Author would prefer to return to the more deferential review
oflegislation applied before Lopez. However, even in light of Lopez,

434

See, e.g., id. at 492·93 (looking at effect of takings total impact).
Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 329 n.17 (1981).

~

Id.

433

~ United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995).

mId.; see also Vermeule, supra note 97, at 11335 (discussing "comprehensive scheme
principle" in Lopez).
438 See supra notes 415·22 (arguing court should defer to congressional findings).
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Morrison and SWANCC, the ESA's regulation of intrastate endangered species is clearly constitutional. Since the early 20th century,
the federal government has exercised concurrent or primary
authority to conserve endangered species and resources. By
contrast, in Lopez, Morrison and SWANCC, the challenged legislation intruded in areas of traditional state concern. The long history
of federal regulation of endangered species and scarce natural
resources supports a finding of legitimacy under the Commerce
Power. In light of their concurring opinion in Lopez and support for
protection of endangered species on private lands in Sweet Home,
there is reason to believe that Justices O'Connor and Kennedy,
likely the Court's swing voters, might take a more deferential
approach to federal regulation of intrastate endangered species
under the Commerce Clause.
Additionally, the ESA does not undermine federalism nor blur
the state-federal distinction. Because its scope is limited to
endangered and threatened species, the ESA does not broadly
displace state authority and is unlike the intrusive federal statutes
in Lopez and Morrison that were found to have impermissibly
interfered with traditional state concerns. Furthermore, the federal
government returns control of species that achieve recovery to the
states. By leaving all non-threatened species to state control, the
ESA recognizes that states and the federal government share
concurrent, yet well demarcated, roles in regulating animals. Under
the ESA's well-defined jurisdiction, there is no danger that species
with abundant populations will fall under federal control.
Perhaps the most difficult and complex issue discussed in this
Article is whether it is appropriate to aggregate commercial
valuable species with those that currently lack value. While
Wickard suggests that Congress has broad authority to aggregate
activities that in themselves have little value, the Supreme Court
has never established a clear test for when aggregation is proper
under the Commerce Power. Under the Necessary and Proper
Clause, Congress has authority to enact statutes that regulate
activities that have a significant commercial impact even if the
regulation encompasses some items that lack commercial value.
The unanswered question concerns the limits of aggregation when
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Congress adopts necessary and proper measures to enforce the
commerce power.
This Article offers three arguments for aggregating all threatened
and endangered species in assessing their impact on interstate
commerce. First, preserving as many threatened and endangered
species as possible promotes biodiversity. Even a species that lacks
its own commercial value may affect others that have such value.
Second, while the future value of preserving endangered or threatened species is somewhat speculative, courts should defer to
legislative findings that preserving genetic material of these species
is likely to produce significant future benefits in medical research
and other commercial areas. The legislative history of the 1973 ESA
amendments demonstrates that Congress believed that the national .
government should err on the side of preservation because the loss
of species and their genetic material could create incalculable losses.
Because it is impossible to know the precise value of endangered
species in the future, courts ought to give greater deference to
congressional concerns than when reviewing noneconomic regulations that significantly intrude on traditional areas of state
regulation. Finally, under the rational basis test used in Lopez and
Morrison, courts should defer to congressional findings that
preserving endangered species will serve the nation's long-term
national interests. Accordingly, under these three justifications,
Congress may regulate even the most commercially invaluable and
geographically isolated species pursuant to its broad authority
under the Commerce Clause.

